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The life insurance marketplace has changed
significantly. Many insureds who once held their policy until
death orsurrenderedit to the issuingcompany duringlife now
instead sell it to a third-party investor. As a result, the
computation of a policy's tax basis has become increasingly
important. Yet, surprisingly, the Code fails to provide a
methodology for making this determination. The IRS has
endorsed one approach in its published guidance but has
failed to adhere to it in its private letter rulings. This paper
calls for a new model. After suggesting legislation, the paper
explores alternative implementation strategies against the
backdrop of deferencejurisprudence.It concludes that, absent
legislation, the IRS should withdraw its publishedguidance
and incorporatethe proposedmodel in regulations.
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A New Modelfor Identifying Basis in Life Insurance

I. INTRODUCTION
In order to compute the gain or loss on the sale or disposition of an asset,
a taxpayer is required to determine the investment's basis.' While ordinarily
straightforward, at least as a theoretical matter, making this determination can be
particularly problematic in the case of a life insurance policy. Since so many
taxpayers own life insurance policies, it is somewhat puzzling that the basiscalculation principles in this context are not more fully developed.
In the past, this uncertainty did not have practical implications. The vast
majority of taxpayers either held their policies until death or allowed them to lapse.
In either case, there was often no need to compute gain or loss, mooting the need
to determine basis. As a result, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts
had few occasions to consider the issue.
In recent years, the function of life insurance has changed, however.
Whereas it once provided economic protection for surviving family members in the
event of a premature death,2 it now also frequently serves an important investment
function.' It is thus not surprising that life insurance policies are now, like other
investments, often sold in the marketplace.4 As a result of these changes, it is
important to reexamine and clarify the application of tax basis principles in the life
insurance context.
The aim of this paper is to consider these tax basis principles in both
descriptive and normative terms. To this end, we have organized the paper into
sections. In Section II we explore general tax basis rules and, in particular, the tax
basis principles applicable to life insurance. In Section III we argue in favor of
1. IRC § 1001(a). For a detailed discussion of IRC § 1001, see Louis A. Del
Cotto, Sales and Other Dispositions of Property Under § 1001: The Taxable Event,
Amount Realized and Related Problems of Basis, 26 Buff. L. Rev. 219 (1977). For an
exhaustive discussion of tax basis rules, see James Edward Maule, Income Tax Basis:
Overview and Conceptual Aspects, 560-2d Tax Management Portfolios.
2. When life insurance policies were first introduced to the marketplace, they
had a singular purpose: to protect against the risk of premature death. Adam F. Scales,
Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of Accidental Death Insurance, 86
Iowa L. Rev. 173, 185-90 (2000). See generally J. Owen Stalson, Marketing Life
Insurance: Its History in America (Harvard Univ. Press 1942); S.S. Huebner & Kenneth
Black Jr., Life Insurance (7th ed. 1969).
3. See The Life Insurance Fact Book 85 (2004) ("In 2003, direct purchases of
permanent life constituted 53% of U.S. individual policies issued and 30% of the total
face amount issued."). See generally, Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, Morals and Markets:
The Development of Life Insurance in the United States (1979); Ben G. Baldwin &
William G. Droms, The Life Insurance Investment Advisor: A Guide to Understanding
and Selecting Today's Insurance Products (1988).
4. See infra Part VI. In addition, because of a confluence of factors, a novel
premium-financing technique has developed. The economic viability of this technique
may well depend upon how the insured computes the basis in the policy. See infra notes
168-70 and accompanying text.
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what we call the policy-investment theory. In Section IV, we illustrate the
application of this theory and call for a Code amendment that would eliminate the
inequity under current law that treats policy surrenders more tax favorably than
policy sales. In the absence of such an amendment, in Section V we focus on
implementation through a different route, suggesting that the IRS withdraw a
taxpayer-friendly revenue ruling and that it promulgate a new regulation; we also
examine recent developments in deference jurisprudence and the Tax Court's
resistance to the Supreme Court's administrative law precedents. In Section VI, we
discuss the changing nature of life insurance and emergence of a new premiumfinancing technique. In Section VII, we offer our conclusions.
H. COMPUTING TAX BASIS

Accurate tax basis identification is important because gains and losses are
measured by the difference between the amount realized and an asset's tax basis.'
A higher tax basis is desirable because it translates into smaller taxable gains and
larger tax-deductible losses. Thus, tax basis determinations directly impact a
taxpayer's tax burden.
In theory, identifying an asset's tax basis should be relatively easy; after
all, tax basis represents the investment a taxpayer has in an asset. For example, if
a taxpayer purchases a tractor for $10,000, $10,000 represents the taxpayer's
investment in the tractor and is thus the tractor's initial cost basis. In practice,
however, determining an asset's tax basis is often quite nettlesome:7 application of
the tax basis rules can be extraordinarily complex and time-consuming
In the case of life insurance, practical application is not the issue - rather,
it is the unsettled nature of the law itself that is problematic. To illustrate, consider
the following example: Suppose a taxpayer purchases a $1 million whole life
insurance policy. Suppose further that the annual premium associated with
maintaining the policy is $10,000 and that the cash surrender value grows $6,000
each year because $4,000 of the premium is attributable to the cost-of-insurance
protection.9 At the end of year ten, what should the taxpayer's tax basis be in the
life insurance policy if it were sold for $150,000?

5. IRC § 1001 (a).
6. IRC § 1012.

7. See generally, Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth
Under the Income Tax, 81 Ind. L.J. 539 (2006).
8. Id. at 547-56.

9. Actuarially, regarding insurance contracts with fixed-death benefits, the life
insurance protection portion of a premium will decrease with each passing year as the
cash reserve increases. To make our illustration easier to follow, however, we
nevertheless assume the life insurance protection portion of the premium remains
constant, disregarding the increase in cash reserve attributable to the earnings buildup
within the policy.
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Some commentators argue that the taxpayer's tax basis in the policy is
$100,000, reflecting the aggregate premiums paid (i.e., 10 x $10,000)- hereinafter
referred to as the aggregate premium theory." After initially utilizing the aggregate
premium theory in published guidance," the IRS has begun to argue in private
letter rulings that the taxpayer's tax basis in the policy should be $60,000, which
reflects the aggregate premiums paid less the annual cost-of-insurance protection
(i.e., 10 x ($10,000 - $4,000)) - hereinafter referred to as the policy investment
theory.'2
In part A, we survey the set of authorities that frame the debate; in part B,
we describe how those who champion the aggregate premium theory support their
point of view; and in part C, we describe how the IRS supports the policy
investment theory.
A. Set ofAuthorities That GenerallyFrame the Debate
In 1920, before the courts began to grapple with the issue, the government
issued an important ruling. In the ruling, Office Decision 724,3 a corporation sold
policies insuring the lives of its officers. Emphasizing that no deduction had been
taken for the premium payments and that the sales price was less than the aggregate
amount of premiums paid, the government ruled that the sales proceeds were not
taxable. In doing so, the government in effect endorsed the aggregate premium
approach. Although the ruling does not explicitly indicate whether gain or loss was
at issue, the most natural reading is that a taxpayer in the posited situation should
experience neither.
In Reverend Ruling 70-38, 4 the IRS indicated that it would continue
adhering to the position taken in Office Decision 724. The ruling posits the same
facts as in the Office Decision except that it makes one additional assumption: the
policies were sold at a price equal to their cash value. Like the Office Decision, the
ruling emphasizes that the sales price is less than the amount of aggregate
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.C.
C.B. 3,244 (1920). In its entirety, the ruling reads as follows:

A corporation which carried insurance policies on the lives of its
officers under which it was named as the beneficiary sold the policies
for a sum less than the total premiums paid and not deducted from
gross income. No part of the amount received for the policies is
taxable.
14. 1970-1 C.B. 11. See also Chief Couns. Adv. 2005-04-001 (dated Oct. 12,
2004) (in characterizing Rev. Rul. 70-38, it states that the corporation discussed in the
ruling was "not required to include in its gross income the amount received from the
sale of the insurance policies").
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premiums and goes on to conclude that the sale thus does not generate any gross
income. Most important, the additional assumption contained in the ruling does not
suggest an abandonment of the aggregate premium approach adopted in the Office
Decision 5
Having set forth this background, we next analyze the consequences
associated with the disposition of life insurance policies, first in those cases in
which taxpayers experienced losses and second in those cases in which taxpayers
experienced gains.
1. Analysis of Cases in Which Taxpayers ExperiencedLosses
In the context of computing losses, the IRS essentially ignored its own
administrative rulings and instead gravitated towards adopting the policy
investment theory. The policy investment theory, with its elimination of mortality
charges from basis (i.e., the annual amount paid for insurance protection),
effectively protects6 taxpayers from converting nondeductible cost-of-insurance into
a deductible loss.'
The first case, StandardBrewing Co. v. Comm 'r, 7 involved facts similar
to those in the Office Decision and the revenue ruling. The corporate taxpayer had
taken out a life insurance policy on the lives of its officers. 8 The total premiums
paid were $11,178.50, and the policy was subsequently surrendered for its cash
value of $6,647.19 The taxpayer attempted to deduct the $4,531.50 difference
between these two figures (i.e., $11,178.50 and $6,647).2o The IRS disallowed this
deduction and the Board ofTax Appeals upheld this position, stating that "[t]o the
extent the premiums paid by the petitioner created in it a right to a surrender value,
they constituted a capital investment. To the extent they exceeded the surrender
value, they constituted payment for earned insurance and were current expenses." 2'
In effect, the court held that the taxpayer's basis was equal to the policy's cash
surrender value (i.e., $6,647), and the insurance protection portion of the premium
15. A sale at a price equal to cash value could certainly produce a taxable gain
in that cash value increases over time as earnings accrue. Yet, under the ruling, no gain
is produced ifthe price is less than the amount of aggregate premiums. Thus, Rev. Rul.
70-38 perpetuates the government's endorsement of the aggregate premium approach
in the Office Decision Indeed, it would be difficult to read the ruling differently
inasmuch as it explicitly acknowledges that it is designed to do nothing more than
restate (rather than overrule) the government's initial position.
16. See IRC § 264 (denying a deduction for the payment of life insurance
premiums). For example, if the taxpayer had paid $10,000 in premiums, sold the policy
for $6,000, and then sought to deduct $4,000 as a loss, IRC § 264 strongly suggests that
this would be an inappropriate outcome.
17. 6 B.T.A. 980, 982 (1927).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 984.
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(i.e., $4,531.50) was an extinguished asset. The taxpayer, therefore, did not sustain
an allowable loss on the sale.
With a single, and ultimately unimportant, exception,' the government
handily won every subsequent case on this issue. Three cases, namely, Keystone
ConsolidatedPublishing Co. v. Comm 'r,23 Century Wood Preserving Co. v.
Comm 'r,24 and Summers & Moore v. Comm 'r,25 involved the sale of life insurance
polices at a price equal to their cash surrender values, which were far less than the
aggregate premiums paid by the taxpayers. In each case, as in StandardBrewing,
the taxpayer sought to deduct as a loss the difference between the (higher)
aggregate premiums paid and the (lower) sales proceeds received. The courts,
however, uniformly denied the deduction, holding that the taxpayer's basis was
equal to the policy's cash surrender value (which, in these cases, equaled the
selling price of the policies). Echoed in many of these decisions is the following
simple principle: "The part of the premiums which represents annual insurance
protection has been earned and used. '26 As such, it could not be embedded in the
policy's tax basis.
Court cases that involved the surrender,rather than the sale, of a policy
have also denied loss deductions to taxpayers who attempted to invoke the
aggregate premium approach. In the context of a policy surrender, the Code directs
taxpayers to use the aggregate premiums paid as their tax basis forgainpurposes;27
in contrast, the Code is silent about how to compute tax basis for loss purposes.
Thus, in the surrender cases as in the sales cases, the courts were required to
compute tax basis using conventional principles in determining the amount of the

22. See Forbes Lithograph Mfg. Co. v. White, 42 F.2d 287, 288 (D. Mass.
1930). The facts of Forbes were virtually identical to those of StandardBrewing Co.:
A corporation owned life insurance policies on the lives of its officers. When the
company surrendered these policies, it sought to take a loss on the difference between
the cash value it received and the premiums it had paid. The Federal District Court of
Massachusetts held in the taxpayer's favor, ruling that the taxpayer's basis in a life
insurance contract was equal to the amount of aggregate premiums it had paid, not the
policy's cash surrender value. In reaching this holding, the court relied almost
exclusively on Lucas v. Alexander, 279 U.S. 573 (1929), a United States Supreme Court
decision. While the Alexander case addressed the issue of tax basis, its primary focus
was the value of certain endowment policies owned on March 1, 1913 (the inception
date of the income tax).
23. 26 B.T.A. 1210 (1932).
24. 69 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1934).
25. B.T.A.M. (P.H.) 35100 (1935).
26. Id. In Century Wood Preserving,the court did not establish a per se rule
that basis is equal to cash value. It held instead that basis must be reduced by the costof-insurance protection and that, given the taxpayer's failure of proof, basis should not
exceed cash value. See 69 F.2d at 968; see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (Jul. 22, 1994)
(adopting this analysis).
27. See IRC § 72(e).
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taxpayer's loss. In London Shoe Co. v. Comm 'r2a and Earlyv. Atkinson," taxpayers
surrendered life insurance policies for their cash value, which, as in the sales cases,
was far less than the aggregate premiums paid. In both cases, the taxpayers sought
to deduct the difference between the (higher) premiums paid and the (lower)
amount received on surrender. The courts denied the loss deduction, adopting the
same reasoning as in the sales cases, concluding that the portion of the premium
attributable to the cost-of-insurance protection should not be included in basis.
It is worth emphasizing that in each set of the cases, whether involving a
sale or surrender, the denial of the loss deduction served an important policy
function. Had the taxpayers been successful, they would have effectively subverted
the rule denying deductions for the payment of life insurance premiums.30
2. Analysis of Cases in Which Taxpayers ExperiencedGains
In the context of computing gains,3' however, courts have taken a
divergent track: they have uniformly assumed that it is appropriate to use the
aggregate premium approach.32 Indeed, in cases involving the taxability of gains,
the IRS did not even suggest the availability of an alternative to the aggregate
premium approach.
By way of background, in endeavors to minimize their tax liabilities,
taxpayers who have experienced gains on the dispositions of their life insurance
policies have sought to secure capital gain treatment.33 These taxpayers were
anxious to secure the preferential capital gain rates?4 But, as will later be
discussed,3 5 in order to qualify as capital gains these taxpayers had to cast their
28. 80 F.2d 230 (2nd Cir. 1935).
29. 175 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1949).
30. See IRC § 264. When formulating its approach in the Office Decision it
issued in 1920 and when restating its position under current law in Rev. Rul. 70-38, the
government may have inadvertently overlooked this concern, failing to appreciate that
its tacit endorsement of the aggregate premium approach would eventually be cited by
taxpayers who experienced gains on the sale of their policies.
31. For a discussion of loss cases, see supra notes 16-27.
32. See infra notes 35, 38.
33. See David F. Shores, Reexamining the Relationship Between Capital Gain
and the Assignment of Income, 13 Ind. L. Rev. 463 (1980); Charles S. Lyon & James
S. Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree As Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case,
17 Tax L. Rev. 293 (1961-62); Note, Distinguishing Ordinary Income from Capital
Gain Where Rights to Future Income Are Sold, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1955-56); Note,
The P.G. Lake Guides to Ordinary Income: An Appraisal in Light of Capital Gains
Policies, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 551 (1961-62) (explaining the P.G. Lake and its
implications).
34. See Gregg A. Esenwein, CRS Reviews Legislative History ofCapital Gains
Income Tax, 2005 TNT 123-17 (June 28, 2005) (report indicates that capital gain tax
rates have historically been much lower than ordinary income tax rates).
35. See infra Part VI.B.
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disposition in the form of a sale or exchange,36 and, second, they had to overcome
the so-called substitution doctrine, under which capital treatment is denied in
instances when taxpayers experience gains that are in essence a substitute for
ordinary income.37
Phillipsv. Comm 'r38 illustrates the difficulties of taxpayers' endeavors to
secure capital gain treatment. In Phillips, the taxpayer owned an endowment
policy. 39 The aggregate premiums of this policy totaled $21,360.49, and it had a

cash surrender value of $26,973.78. 40The taxpayer sold the policy for $26,750 to
two of his partners, twelve days before its maturity value of $27,000. 4 , The issue
before the court was the character of the $5,389.51 gain (i.e., $26,750 less
$21,360.49) the taxpayer had recognized (not whether the taxpayer's basis in the
policy was $21,360.49 or some lesser number to reflect mortality charges).42 The
taxpayer argued that long-term capital gain treatment was appropriate because the
policy was a capital asset, it was sold, and it was held for the requisite holding
period.43
The Fourth Circuit had an entirely different perspective. Relying on
several Supreme Court precedents," it asserted that a "taxpayer may not convert
such income into capital gain by a bona fide sale of the contract which is the means
of producing such ordinary income." ' Several other courts reached the identical
conclusion on the character-of-gain issue," largely premised on the Fourth Circuit
Court's same line of reasoning.
47
While Phillipsand the other cases involved character-of-income issues,
all of these courts assumed the taxpayer's basis was equal to the aggregate
premiums the taxpayers had paid for the policies in question (e.g., $21,360.49 in
the Phillips decision). In none of these cases did the IRS argue (or even suggest)
that amounts paid for the insurance protection feature caused the taxpayer's
reported basis to be less, nor did any of the courts unilaterally raise this issue."
In the end, one might fairly characterize the decided cases on the issue of
tax basis as falling into one of two camps: the loss cases, where the courts applied
36. See IRC § 1222 (requiring a "sale or exchange").
37. See infra Part VI.B.2.
38. 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960).
39. Id. at 33.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 34.
42. Id.
43. Phillips,275 F.2d at 36.

44. E.g., Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28 (1941); Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356
U.S. 260 (1958).
45. Phillips,275 F.2d at 35.

46. Estate of Croker v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 605 (1962); Neese v. Comm'r, 23
T.C.M. 1748 (1964); Avery v. Comm'r, 111 F.2d 19 (9th Cir. 1940); Gallun v. Comm'r,
327 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1964).
47. See supra notes 28-38.
48. See supra notes 35 and 38 and accompanying text.
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the policy investment approach; and the gain cases, where the courts assumed the
application of the aggregate premium approach.
What accounts for this confusion? First, the government itself bears
responsibility. The 1920 Office Decision, together with its restatement in Reverend
Rulling 70-38, has made no small contribution in terms of shaping the tax basis
issue. Remaining faithful to its position in these rulings, the IRS has apparently not
argued in court that the principle established in the loss cases should be applied in
gain cases. Second, in permitting taxpayers to use the aggregate premium approach
in determining gain on the surrenderof a policy,49 the Code itself fosters the
impression that gain on a sale should likewise be determined under this
methodology. And, third, while, as suggested, there is a strong policy undercurrent
driving the result in the loss cases,50 the gain cases which have a very different
complexion," have not grappled with this difference.
B. Survey of the Aggregate Premium Theory
There are, in essence, three lines of reasoning that support the aggregate
premium theory.52 First, the most compelling argument that can be made on behalf
of the aggregate premium approach is that the IRS itself has embraced it. As
indicated, in Reverend Ruling 70-38, which restates Office Decision 724, the IRS
concludes that a sale of a policy for less than the amount of aggregate premiums
produces neither gain nor loss.53 While the revenue ruling assumes that the sales
price is equal to the policy's cash value, it cannot reasonably be read as implying
that gain would be recognized if the price were greater than the cash value but still
less than the amount ofaggregate premiums.M The ruling merely restates the Office
Decision under current law, and, in the Office Decision, no mention is made of the
policy's cash surrender value; it simply hypothesizes a sale at a price that is less
than the aggregate premium amount.5" Moreover, a sale of a policy for a price
equal to its cash surrender value should, in most instances, under a correct
49. See IRC § 72(e)(6).
50. See supra note 16.
51. See supra notes 28-38.
52. For a discussion of these arguments, see, generally, Michael J. Frankel,
Life Settlements: Sale of Life Insurance Policies in the Open Market, in 39th Annual
Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning (2005); Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby,
The Tax Treatment of Life Insurance Settlements, 19 Ins. Tax Rev. 385 (2000); see also
Sherwin P. Simmons, Life-Settlements, Senior Settlements, and Other Variations on
Viatical Sales, SK020 ALI-ABA 163 (2004) (mentioning an opinion letter issued by the
accounting firm KPMG to Viaticus, Inc., that endorses this position).
53. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
54. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-50-045 (Sept. 17, 1980) (describing Rev. Rul. 70-38
as authority for the proposition that taxpayers are not required "to include in [their]
gross income the amount received from the sale of the insurance policies").
55. Id.
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application of the policy investment approach, produce gain. More specifically, to
the extent that the cash value grows as a result of an earnings buildup in the
policy's reserve value, gain should be recognized in the case of a sale for a price
equal to the policy's cash value under the policy investment theory, even if the
price is less than aggregate premiums. 6 In concluding that gain is not recognized
on the facts of the ruling, the IRS implicitly disavowed the policy investment
approach. The IRS's position is, moreover, reflected in its failure to object to the
taxpayer's use of the aggregate premium ai)proach in the gain cases where the
character of income was at issue.57 As a result, whatever merit the policy
investment theory holds, taxpayers ought to be able to rely on its apparent rejection
by the IRS, at least until its own rulings are withdrawn."
The second line of argument supporting the aggregate premium approach
is predicated on the treatment of a policy surrender. In the case of a policy
surrender, as suggested, the Code explicitly permits taxpayers to use the aggregate
premium approach for purposes of computing gain.59 Thus, the Code does lend
some indirect support to the proponents of the aggregate premium approach.
Indeed, there is no other provision in the Code directing that a different approach
be taken in computing basis in the context of a sale. Given this silence in the face
of the Code's explicit adoption of the aggregate premium payment approach in
Code section 72, and given the inequity that necessarily results from treating a
taxpayer who surrenders a policy differently from one who sells it to a third party,'
the argument in favor of applying the aggregate premium approach in both
contexts is not entirely unappealing.
A final line of argument, made by some of the aggregate premium
proponents, is that a life insurance policy is a unitary asset with two integrated
components: an investment component inthe form ofcash reserves and a personalconsumption component in the form of insurance protection. One might analogize
life insurance to other personal-use assets, like a home, which also have an
56. To illustrate, assume that, after paying a premium of $10,000, the cash
value at the end of one year is equal to $6,300 or the sum of(i) $6,000 (the residual after
accounting for the insurance protection charge) plus (ii) the earnings buildup accruing
during the year, here assumed to be $300. A sale of the policy for its cash surrender
value, $6,300, would produce $300 of gain under the policy investment approach (see
supra Part IV), but produces no gain under the aggregate premium approach.
57. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text.
58. See infra Part V.
59. IRC § 72(e)(5) provides that "the amount received on the surrender of a life
insurance contract is included in gross income to the extent it exceeds the 'investment
in the contract."' The Code amplifies the meaning of investment in a contract with the
following definition: it is the "aggregate premiums paid less amounts received under the
contract before the surrender that were not included in gross income." IRC § 72(e)(6).
60. See London Shoe Co. v. Comm'r, 80 F.2d 230 (2nd Cir. 1935)
(acknowledging the lack of parallelism between the predecessor of Code § 72 and the
provisions in the Code that determine basis in the policy).
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investment and a personal-consumption component.6 As the argument goes, the
owner of a home is not required to reduce basis on account of usage.62 So why, the
proponents ofthe aggregate premium approach ask, should life insurance be treated
differently? They accordingly maintain that the mortality charges for the cost of life
insurance should not result in a tax basis reduction.
C. Survey of the Policy Investment Theory

Notwithstanding the formal position it adopted in Office Decision 724 and
Reverend Ruling 70-38, the IRS has begun to flirt with the policy investment
theory. It first deviated from its published position in Private Letter Ruling 9443020.63 This ruling discussed the tax implications where a taxpayer afflicted with
AIDS sold an insurance policy on his life to a viatical settlement company.
The first issue addressed in this ruling was whether the sale of the policy
constituted a taxable event; the second issue was how to compute the taxable
amount if this event were taxable. The IRS ruled that the proceeds from this sale
61. Cf Moseley v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 183 (1979). In Moseley, the taxpayer
purchased a $5,000 twenty-payment life insurance policy. The policy required annual
premium payments of $192.40. The policy also contained a special provision
establishing that the insurance company would credit to a special reserve account $96.20
of the annual premiums paid from the second to the fifth year of the policy. At the end
of the policy's tenth or twentieth year, assuming the policy owner were still living, the
policy owner would have the right to receive a dividend distribution essentially equal
to the then-value of the special reserve account.
Twenty years after the policy's inception, the taxpayer exercised his right to
receive a dividend distribution and was sent a check equal to $3,561.95. The taxpayer
took the position that this amount was not taxable because his aggregate premiums
totaled $3,848 and Code § 72(e)(1)(B) shielded from tax any amounts received up to
this threshold (i.e., the dividend distribution did not exceed the aggregate premium
payments). The IRS disputed this position: it argued that the special reserve account
should be treated separately and apart from the insurance protection part of the policy.
Therefore, because the taxpayer received a dividend payment in excess of the premium
payments allocated to the special reserve account, the taxpayer experienced a taxable
event on the difference between the proceeds he received ($3,561.95) and the amount
he invested ($384.80, i.e., 4 x $96.20).
The underlying premise ofthe IRS's approach was that there were "two distinct
and economically independent policies" at work, and thus a bifurcated analysis of each
component of the policy was appropriate. Id. at 186. The Tax Court did not see it this
way, however. The court pointed out that the two components of the contract were
interrelated and, furthermore, that neither of these components could be separately
purchased. That being the case, the court held that the phrase aggregatepremiums as
used in the Code applied to the whole contract. Id. at 187. In the court's view, "the
special reserve provisions [were] inseparable from the insurance provisions of the
policy," so the court ruled in the taxpayer's favor. Id.
62. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
63. Dated Jul. 22, 1994.
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were taxable to the taxpayer under Code section 61, noting that the shelter of Code
section 101(a), which excludes policy proceeds from income, only applies in
circumstances when the insured has died.'
Next, the IRS sought to compute the amount of the taxable gain resulting
from the sale. To do so, it needed to determine the taxpayer's basis in his life
insurance policy. The IRS first indicated that the governing Code sections were
1011, 1012, and 1016 and then added that the relevant case law included Century
Wood and London Shoe. On the basis of these authorities, the IRS declared that the
taxpayer's basis in his life insurance policy was equal "to the premiums paid less
the sum of(i) the cost-of-insurance protection provided through the date of sale and
(ii) any amounts (e.g., dividends) received under the contract that have not been
included in gross income. '
The controversial part of the IRS's ruling was its insistence that, contrary
to Office Decision 724 and Reverend Ruling 70-38, the policy's tax basis be
reduced by the insurance protection portion of the premium (invoking, in effect,
the policy investment theory). 6Since issuing Private Letter Ruling 94-43-020 and
other private letter6 rulings,
the IRS has continued to argue in favor of the policy
7
theory.
investment
64. Id. This private letter ruling predates the passage of Code § 101 (g) (a Code
section that now excludes the receipt of viatical settlements from income). See also IRC
§ 101(a).
65. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (Jul. 22, 1994).
66. Id. To determine the actual amount of the reduction, the IRS offered the
following guidance: "[T]he cost-of-insurance protection may be approximated using the
difference between (i) the aggregate amount of premiums paid and (ii) the cash value
of the contract with regard to surrender charges." Id. at n.4 (citing Century Wood
Preserving Co. v. Comm'r, 69 F.2d. 967 (3rd Cir. 1934)). Applying the IRS formula to
our hypothetical, where the annual premiums are $10,000 but the annual cash surrender
value grows by only $6,000, the annual insurance protection cost is $4,000.
67. See Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 1999-832, Vaugn # 242 (undated), in which the
taxpayer in question was a shareholder in an S corporation. The S corporation
experienced losses that the taxpayer wished to deduct. The Code, however, limits
allowable losses to the amount of tax basis shareholders have in their S corporation
shares (IRC § 1366(d)(1)); all losses in excess of such basis are suspended (IRC §
1366(d)(2)). The IRS was charged with the duty of determining the taxpayer's basis in
his S corporation stock, which, in turn, would determine the amount of the taxpayer's
allowable losses.
By way of background, a shareholder's basis in an S corporation is generally
equal to the shareholder's initial capital investment subject to several annual
adjustments. These adjustments are detailed in Code § 1367, including one that provides
a reduction for "any expense of the corporation not deductible in computing its taxable
income and not properly chargeable to capital account." IRC § 1367(a)(2)(D). This
downward basis adjustment was critically relevant to the question at hand because the
S corporation made premium payments to fund several insurance policies on the lives
of its key employees. More specifically, the S corporation paid annual premiums of
$10,000 (the actual number was redacted from the text), of which $6,000 (again, the
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For example, in Chief Counsel Advisory Opinion 2005-04-001, the IRS
discussed the tax consequences for a taxpayer who owned a life insurance policy
on the life of her ex-spouse.' After five years of owning the policy and paying
premiums, the taxpayer was fraudulently enticed by the insurance company
underwriting the policy to convert it into a new policy on the life of her exhusband. A court found that the insurance company had misled the taxpayer and
granted her a cash award. The portion of the award that related to interest was
admittedly taxable. The remaining portion of the award, the taxpayer argued, was
a tax-free recovery of the premiums and costs the taxpayer had paid with respect
to the policy on her ex-spouse. The IRS did not agree: consistent with Private
Letter Ruling 94-43-020, the IRS argued that the insurance protection portion of
the policy had already benefitted the taxpayer. That being the case, this portion of
the premium payment could not constitute tax basis in the policy and thereby be
used to shelter any of the taxpayer's recovery.
Ill. THE THEORETICAL SUPERIORITY OF THE
POLICY INVESTMENT APPROACH

The aggregate premium theory and the policy investment theory are at
direct odds; each offers a different outcome insofar as tax basis determinations are
concerned. The question to which we turn is whether the policy investment
approach or the aggregate premium approach is preferable.
But before we answer this question, we explore the nature of life insurance
and how, from a property perspective, it should be classified. Like other personaluse assets having personal-consumption and investment-type components, life
insurance policies engender two different kinds of cost that must be distinguished
actual number was redacted from the text) was attributable to the cash surrender value
of the policies and was reflected as an asset on the company's books, while the
remaining $4,000 (this number represents an extrapolation of the prior two figures) was
treated as a nondeductible company expense.
Code § 264 explicitly states that the premiums paid by a taxpayer for life
insurance constitute a nondeductible expense. Accordingly, Code § 1367 (which, as just
indicated, mandates a downward basis adjustment for any nondeductible expense)
required that the shareholders reduce the tax basis they had in their shares by the
premium payment. But by what number - the full amount of the premium paid
($10,000) or the insurance protection portion of the premium ($4,000)?
Ruling in the taxpayer's favor, the IRS limited the taxpayer's downward basis
adjustment to $4,000. The IRS stated that "the premium payments by [the taxpayer]
reduce shareholders' basis to the extent those premiums are truly made in return for life
insurance." The other portion of the premium, related to the policy's cash surrender
value, "results in the corporation receiving a valuable proprietary right" and therefore
has no effect on the shareholder's basis in his S corporation stock. From the IRS's
perspective, this bifurcated approach towards life insurance policy analysis was the one
that best corresponded with economic reality.
68. Dated Oct. 12, 2004.

2006]

A New Modelfor Identifying Basis in Life Insurance

for tax purposes: the cost of acquisition and the cost of upkeep. Taxpayers can
include the former,69 but not the latter,7" in the tax basis oftheir personal-use assets.
Distinguishing between acquisition and upkeep costs is thus very
important. Yet, making this distinction is sometimes challenging, particularly for
life insurance policies. In Section A we explore the different nature of these
expenditures, enabling us from a better vantage point in Section B to analyze the
correct tax treatment of life insurance policies.
A. DistinguishingBetween Acquisition and Upkeep Costs
As indicated,7 when taxpayers make expenditures, the Code attaches
importance to how these expenditures are classified: the cost of acquisition is
embedded in an asset's tax basis, whereas the cost of upkeep is extinguished and
does not become part of an asset's tax basis.
To illustrate this point, consider two examples that entail acquisition and
upkeep expenses. The first involves the purchase of a single use asset that for tax
purposes is treated as a unitary whole. The second involves the purchase of a dual
use asset that for tax purposes is treated as two separate and distinct assets.
Example 1: Single Use Asset. Suppose a husband and wife purchase a
home for personal enjoyment and secondarily as a form of investment. Consider
the tax consequences associated with this purchase. The Code permits acquisition
costs (including items such as title searches and attorney fees) to be included in the
tax basis the taxpayers have in their home;72 by including such costs in basis, at the
time of subsequent sale, they can be recouped tax-free as a return of capital. On the
other hand, the expenses associated with the cost of upkeep (including items such
as painting and plumbing repairs) cannot be added to tax basis because these
expenses represent nondeductible personal-consumption;73 by excluding such
expenses from basis, they cannot be recouped tax-free at the time of subsequent
sale.74
69. IRC § 1012.
70. See IRC § 1016(a) (does not specify any adjustments that pertain to upkeep
or maintenance expenses).
71. See supra notes 60 and 61 and accompanying text.
72. IRC § 1016(a).
73. IRC § 262. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(d)(5)(ii) 71 Fed. Reg.
48590-01 (Aug. 2006) (indicating that, as a general rule, repairs to a residence may not
be included in basis unless incurred in the context of a remodeling or restoration).
74. To permit these expenses to be embedded into the tax basis of the home
would effectively allow taxpayers to transform these expenditures into (deferred)
deductible expenses. Consider another kind of personal-use asset, namely an
automobile. Assume a taxpayer purchases a $20,000 automobile, producing a tax basis
in the automobile of an equivalent amount (i.e., $20,000). Assume further that the
taxpayer incurred maintenance costs of $2,000 and then sold the automobile four years
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As a theoretical matter, taxpayers who use their assets for personal
purposes should be required to reduce their basis to reflect the economic decline
attributable to such use.7" Because the Code does not mandate these downward
basis adjustments, however, taxpayers are in effect permitted to create tax
deductions from their personal-consumption expenditures - an incongruous result
given the Code's general commitment to a denial of deductions for such
expenditures.76
To illustrate, suppose a husband and wife purchase a home for $500,000
(with $400,000 of the value attributable to the house and $100,000 attributable to
the land). Suppose further that they inhabit the home for many years and that,
through wear and tear, its value is reduced to $0. (Of course, no depreciation
deductions are actually allowed because the home is not used in the taxpayers'
trade or business.) 77 Upon the taxpayers' subsequent sale of their home for
$1,100,000 (enjoying a profit attributable to the increase in the value of the
underlying land),78 in computing their gain, the taxpayers are able to utilize
$500,000 as the appropriate tax basis, rather than the $100,000 basis that, as a
matter of theory, would be appropriate.79
In permitting the taxpayers a $500,000 basis, the Code enables taxpayers
to ignore the personal-consumption element of their home use. More specifically,
the taxpayers are able to shift the personal-consumption element of their home into
the investment component rooted in the land. This shift in basis from the personal
to the investment component effects a conversion ofconsumption-type expenditure
later for $12,000. The taxpayer's basis in the automobile would remain $20,000, with
the cost of maintenance viewed as a consumption-type expenditure that could not be
included in basis; the resulting $8,000 loss would not be deductible because it in effect
represents consumption. See IRC §165(c). This loss disallowance rule makes the basis
computation academic, though it would have practical significance in terms of
computing gain were the automobile to appreciate for some reason above its tax basis
of $20,000.
75. See Richard A. Epstein, The Consumption and Loss of Personal Property
Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 454, 461 (1971) (argues that
taxpayers should have to reduce the basis they have in their personal-use assets to reflect
their consumption of such items); Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 Tax L.
Rev. 45, 81-85 (1990) (indicating that tax on imputed income from consumer durables
is appropriate and suggesting that depreciation deductions would be required under such
an approach).
76. Notwithstanding the sound theoretical justification for these basis
reductions, for reasons of administrative convenience, the Code does not mandate basis
adjustments such as those proposed.
77. See IRC § 168.
78. Edward L. Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Impact of Building Restrictions
on Housing Affordability, 9 Econ. Pol. Rev. 21-39 (June 2003) (presenting a study that
indicates how zoning laws are a major contributor to higher land values).
79. Of course, the taxpayers could seek to exclude a portion of this gain under
IRC § 121.
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into a tax deduction (a basis offset) and is therefore difficult tojustify theoretically.
Nonetheless, adherents ofthe aggregate premium theory build upon this example:8"
they declare, in the name of parity with these homeowners, that the tax basis
taxpayers have in their insurance policies should not be reduced by any personalconsumption on their part, but rather shifted to the investment component of their
policies.
Example 2: Dual Use Asset. Suppose a husband and wife instead
purchased a two-family home and rented one of the two units. In this example,
based a long line of cases82 and Treasury regulations,83 the two80. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
81. Id.
82. There is a long history of cases that state it is appropriate for an asset to
have two separate tax bases when a particular set of circumstances exist, e.g., mixed
business- and personal-use property, and where inequities would arise were the asset
deemed to have a singular tax basis. For a complete analysis of instances when courts
have invoked a bifurcated basis approach, see James Maule, Income Tax Basis:
Overview and Conceptual Aspects, 560 Tax Mgm't Portfolios (BNA) A102-AI04
(2000).
One case that amply illustrates this point is Sharp v. United States, 199 F.
Supp. 743 (Dist. ofDel. 1961), aff'd, 303 F.3rd 783 (3rd Cir. 1962). In Sharp, taxpayers
purchased an airplane for $47,000 (to facilitate comprehension, we have generally
rounded the numbers enumerated in the decision), made capital expenditures to it of
$8,000 (making the airplane's overall tax basis $55,000), and used it for both business
and leisure (roughly 24% for business and 76% for leisure). With respect to the
business portion of the airplane, over the ensuing years, the taxpayer took depreciation
deductions totaling approximately $14,000 and subsequently sold the airplane for
$35,380. Id. at 744.
For tax computation purposes, the taxpayers claimed that the plane's tax basis
was approximately $41,000 (i.e., $55,000 initial cost basis less the $14,000 of claimed
depreciation deductions). Id. The taxpayers therefore claimed that they had experienced
an economic loss of approximately $6,000 (i.e., the amount realized of $35,380 less the
airplane's adjusted basis of $41,000). Id.
The IRS had a much different perspective. In light of the fact that the airplane
was used 24% for business and 76% for leisure, it treated the airplane as if it were two
separate planes, one used exclusively for business and the other exclusively for leisure,
and accordingly made the following computations:
Business Plane
Cost Basis
Depreciation

$14,300
($14,000)

Leisure Plane
$40,700
($ 0)

Adjusted Basis

$

Amount Realized on Sale
Adjusted Basis

$ 9,321
($ 300)

$26,058
($40,700)

Gain/Loss

$ 9,021

- $14,642

300

$40,700

FloridaTax Review

[Vol. 7.-9

family home would be treated as two separate assets: a personal home and a rental
unit.' As to the personal-home component, the analysis set forth in the fust
example would apply. In contrast, as to the rental-unit component, a different tax
treatment results. The rental unit would be classified as "property used in the
taxpayer's trade or business." 5 As such, its value would thus be depreciated and

The IRS claimed that the taxpayers must recognize the gain related to the "business
airplane" but denied allowance of the loss due to the fact that it was neither a loss
incurred in a trade or business nor a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit.
Sharp, 199 F. Supp. at 745. See IRC § 165(c).
The issue before the Sharp court was whether the IRS was correct in treating the
airplane in question as two airplanes. From the outset of its analysis, the court made
clear that the "taxpayers are clearly in error if it is their contention that courts will not
regard a thing, normally accepted as an entity, as divisible for tax purposes." Sharp, 199
F. Supp. at 745. The court offered a myriad of examples when predecessor courts treated
a unitary item as two distinct parts. Id. The taxpayers nevertheless attempted to
distinguish their fact pattern from the cases the court cited. Id. The crux of the
taxpayers' position was that all of these cases involved two distinct assets. Their own
case, however, involved one asset. As averred by the taxpayers, an
airplane is not capable of separation into business and personal-uses in the
same way that a hotel is separable from the land on which it stands, or in the
same way that unharvested crop may be separated from the trees of the grove,
or the accounts receivable from the other partnership assets. Id. at 746.
The taxpayers added that "[tihere were not two airplanes, ... - a business airplane and
a personal airplane - there was one airplane. There were not two sales; there was but
one sale, one adjusted basis and one selling price." Id.
Although having superficial attraction, the taxpayers' position was dismissed by the
court. Id. It held that if the taxpayers' theory were to prevail, a lack of uniformity would
beset similarly situated taxpayers. Id. at 747. In support of its position, the court offered
an example of a hypothetical taxpayer who purchased property, used it exclusively for
business, depreciated it, and then sold it for a gain. Sharp, 199 F. Supp. at 747. It then
compared the plight of the first hypothetical taxpayer to a different hypothetical
taxpayer who purchased a piece of property fourfold the size and cost and used onefourth of the property for business and three-fourths for personal-use. Id. The court
posited that under a uniform rule, the same tax consequences should befall the first and
second hypothetical taxpayers upon the sale of the business-use property. Id. Under the
taxpayers' approach, however, the first and second hypothetical taxpayers would each
experience a different tax outcome, making the result inherently inequitable. Id. The
court also pointed out that the taxpayers' methodology of calculating their depreciation
deduction (24% of the airplane rather than the whole) suggested the taxpayers' tacit
endorsement that the airplane was really two separate and distinct pieces of property
"trapped" in one body.
83. Regs. § 1.121-1(e).
84. See supra note 73.
85. IRC § 123 1(b).
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the costs associated with its upkeep would be deductible 6 or capitalized, 7 as the
case may be. When the taxpayers subsequently sold the two-family home, the
Code would treat the sale as if it consisted of two components. 8 An allocation of
the sales price would therefore have to be made, and two independent tax analyses
would have to be conducted. 9
To illustrate, suppose taxpayers purchased a two-family home for
$500,000, with $375,000 of the value allocable to the personal-home component
and $125,000 of the value allocable to the rental-unit component of the property.
Suppose further that the taxpayers were permitted $100,000 of depreciation
deductions with respect to the rental-unit component. Consider the tax
consequences were the two-family home sold for $1.1 million. 9 The allocation
would be as follows:

Cost Basis
Depreciation
Adjusted Basis
Amount Realized on Sale
Adjusted Basis
Gain

Home

Rental Property

$375,000
($ 0)
$375,000

$125,000
($100,000)
$ 25,000

$825,000
($375,000)
$450,000

$275,000
($ 25,000)
$250,000

What Example 2 illustrates is that tax basis cannot be shifted or "shared"
between the personal-use property (i.e., the personal-use component) and the
rental-unit component. Each component retains its own share of basis.9'
Like a home, nonterm insurance is typcally acquired for investment and
noninvestment reasons. More specifically, they acquire life insurance as a mode of
consumption (i.e., a mechanism to alleviate emotional concerns and family turmoil
in the event of an untimely death) and also as an investment vehicle (i.e., a ready
reserve of assets that the policy owner can borrow from or withdraw against).
Notwithstanding taxpayers' different motives in acquiring such life insurance, there
is no need to decide whether a life insurance policy is a unitary asset (which
permits a shift in basis from the personal-use component to the investment
component) or a dual use asset (which does not permit a shift in basis). In either
case, the cost-of-insurance protection cannot be appropriately viewed as a cost of
acquisition; it is instead a cost of upkeep. And, as we elaborate, under either the
unitary or dual use model, it cannot be included in basis.
86. IRC § 168(a).
87. IRC § 263.
88. See supra note 73.
89. Id.
90. See supra note 69.
91. See supra note 73.

FloridaTax Review

[Vol79

B. The Nature ofLife Insurance
Having decided that classifying life insurance as a unitary or dual use asset
is irrelevant to the basis question, the critical issue thus is to distinguish between
the acquisition and upkeep costs as they pertain to life insurance. We believe that
the portion of the premium allocated to investment, including any commissions
incurred in acquiring the investment, should be included in the policy's tax basis.
In contrast, the mortality charges associated with the maintenance of the policy
should be excluded.
Adherents to the aggregate premium theory are misguided when they
claim that the portion of the premium allocable to the cost of maintaining the
insurance can be added to the policy's tax basis. The critical flaw in their argument
is that they treat all premium expenses as acquisition costs. Yet, this proposition
cannot possibly be true: just as a home needs annual repairs to keep it in good
working order, a life insurance policy generally needs an annual cash infusion to
keep it intact.
Indeed, where the courts have considered the basis question in the context
of a sale at a loss, they have uniformly treated the premium portion allocable to the
carrying costs of the policy as an annual upkeep expense.92 As such they have
excluded the cost-of-insurance protection from basis and denied the claimed loss
deduction.93 And although the IRS in both Office Decision 724 and Reverend
Ruling 70-38 concluded that the cost-of-insurance protection may be included in
basis in the context of computing gain, it failed to provide a theory that would
justify such a departure from conventional tax-basis principles.
In the end, the aggregate premium theory cannot be justified on policy
grounds. It rests on the fallacious assumption that premium payments related to the
mortality charge must be added to the basis of the investment component. There
is, in short, no justification for attributing the cost-of-insurance protection to the
investment component.
IV. COMPUTING TAX BASIS UNDER THE POLICY INVESTMENT THEORY
Having established the superiority of the policy investment theory, we
consider its application. Insurance companies do not ordinarily provide the insured
with a statement allocating a portion of the premium to the cost-of-insurance
protection. Nevertheless, there are actuarial tables readily available that could fulfill
this function (i.e., indicating how much insurance companies would hypothetically
charge for term insurance for a comparable insured). The difference between the
aggregate premium payments the taxpayer makes and the hypothetical term
insurance figures located on these tables should represent the taxpayer's investment

92. See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
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(tax basis) in the insurance policy. Hereinafter, we refer to this methedology for
determining basis as the hypothetical term method. 9
A. Mechanism to Determine the Investment Portionof an Insurance Policy
When a taxpayer makes premium payments, insurance companies often
internally separate these premium payments into different "baskets." That is, they
place one portion of the premium into the "basket" that houses the taxpayer's
investment (i.e., the policy's reserve account), if any, and they place the other
portion of the premium into the "basket" used to pay life insurance. Since this is
how, for internal bookkeeping purposes, insurance companies handle the receipt
of premium payments or contract charges, it seems rather obvious that the
identification of tax basis should follow suit.
Consider, for example, Estate of Wong Wing Non v. Comm r, a case in
which a taxpayer purchased a twenty-year endowment life insurance policy that
included, in the case of disability, a waiver-of-premium feature. Approximately
halfway through the contract's term, the taxpayer became disabled and was no
longer obligated to make premium payments. When the policy ultimately matured,
the taxpayer received the face amount of the policy along with accumulated mutual
insurance dividends and interest. The taxpayer claimed that he was not taxable on
the latter portion because the aggregate premiums paid included those that were
paid on his behalf when he became disabled. The court disagreed, holding instead
that, for tax basis purposes, the premium payments were separable: the premium
portion that related to the investment feature of the contract counted towards tax
basis; in contrast, the premium portion directed towards disability protection (that
was annually exhausted) did not constitute part of the policy's aggregate basis.'
To illustrate the point the Wing Non court made in the life insurance
context and application of the hypothetical term method, consider a forty-year-old
male who obtains a $1 million whole life insurancepolicy with annual premiums
of $10,000. Suppose further that the annual premium payments for a $1 million
term life insurancepolicy would be $4,000. Given the premium cost and the
hypothetical cost of term insurance supplied by actuarial tables, the taxpayer's
basis under the hypothetical term method would be $60,000 after ten years
($100,000 aggregate premium payments less the aggregate term cost of$40,000). 97
94. In the context of split-dollar policies, the IRS already has instituted this
procedure. See IRS Notice 2002-8, 2002-1 C.B. 398 (permitting an approach similar
to the one advocated here).
95. 18 T.C. 205 (1952).
96. EstateofWong WingNon, 18 T.C. at 209-10; see Rev. Rul. 55-349, 1955-1
C.B. 232 (premiums paid that are attributed to other benefits, such as disability, are not
includible in computing total premiums paid for an endowment contract).
97. See supra note 9, which points out that as a practical reality, each year, as
the internal reserve amount grows in value, the amount of insurance coverage will
correspondingly decline. That being the case, each year this method will produce a
smaller insurance charge.
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At least as expressed in its private letter ruling stance, the IRS has a
somewhat different approach to identify the tax basis of life insurance policy.9" The
basic formula is the same: tax basis is equal to the aggregate premiums paid less
the cost-of-insurance. As one possibility to determine the cost-of-insurance, the
IRS instructs taxpayers to subtract the cash surrender value of their policies from
the aggregate premiums paid. In effect, under this approach a policy's tax basis will
equal the policy's cash surrender value. The IRS does, however, anticipate that this
formula will not always produce the correct answer, and it reserves the right to
compute basis in a different fashion. To illustrate, consider the prior example ofthe
person who purchased a $1 million whole life insurance policy with annual
premiums of$ 10,000 and an initial annual insurance cost of $4,000. As previously
indicated, at the end often years, the taxpayer's investment in the policy should
equal $60,000. Yet, depending upon the policy's terms and conditions, the cash
surrender value of the policy could be much larger, say $90,000, attributable to
unrealized gains, interest, and dividends that the underwriting company may be
obligated to credit to the policyholder's account. In this case, the IRS would
presumably not permit the taxpayer a $90,000 basis (the cash surrender value); for
if it did, the accretion would escape tax.
B. The Appropriate Tax Treatment ofInsurance Commissions
How would the cost of commissions and similar expenses incurred in the
course of originating the policy be treated under the hypothetical term method?
Superficially, these expenditures appear to be extinguished at the moment of their
outlay. Yet not all of these costs can be attributed solely to the cost-of-insurance
protection component. In other words, a portion of these costs is attributable to the
policy's investment component, and, as such, should be embedded in the policy's
tax basis."
The hypothetical term method would properly account for these costs. The
term factor supplied by the tables would necessarily include the cost of origination
ordinarily incurred in acquiring a term policy. For example, in the prior illustration,
the term factor according to the tables was $4,000; this figure would represent the
98. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020, at n.4 (July 22, 1994).
99. Consider, for the example, the purchase of a $20,000 automobile along
with a $2,000 maintenance contract. It would be inappropriate to attribute a 10%
commission paid on the purchase price of the automobile exclusively to the maintenance
contract. Instead, the automobile should be viewed as having a cost basis of $22,000
($20,000 purchase price plus 10% commission of$2,000), and the maintenance contract
as having a cost basis of $2,200 ($2,000 cost plus $200 commission). Similarly, in the
case of an insurance policy, the origination costs attributable to the investment
component, as opposed to the costs attributable to the protection component, should be
reflected in basis for purposes of computing gain. But see Chief Couns. Adv. Mem.
2005-04-001 (dated Oct. 12, 2004) (concluding that origination costs may not be
included in the basis of a policy).
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premium for a comparable term policy and would therefore include the cost of
originating such a policy. Any amount paid in excess of the term factor would be
attributable to the policy's investment component. Thus, if the actual premium
were $10,000, the $6,000 excess would represent the cost of acquiring the
investment component and should therefore constitute the taxpayer's basis in the
policy. " In the context of so-called split-dollar insurance, the government recently
adopted a similar method for differentiating between the costs of these two
components. 101
One might question whether the suggested approach tends to improperly
inflate the policy's tax basis. This line of reasoning does not, however, take into
account the fact that an insured agrees to incur the additional origination costs
permanent (nonterm) insurance entails in order to acquire the investment
component, not the insurance protection component of the policy. Indeed, were it
not for the advantages the investment component makes available, the insured
would instead presumably have purchased a term policy. Thus, to the extent that
the permanent insurance costs more to originate than term insurance, the excess
costs are properly attributed to the investment component of the policy and should
accordingly be reflected in the policy's tax basis.
What is evident from this analysis is that the hypothetical term method
should be applied to all taxpayers who dispose of a policy, whether by sale to a
third party or by predeath surrenderto the issuing insurance company. This is
appropriate not only because it produces the correct basis, but also because it
eliminates the inequity oftreating taxpayers who sell their policies differently from
taxpayers who surrender their policies. Under current law, Code section 72
mandates the use of the aggregate premium method in the case of a policy
surrender. At the same time, in private letter rulings the IRS maintains, despite its
100. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020, invoking Century Wood Preserving Co. v.
Comm'r, 69 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1934) for the principle that basis should be reduced by
the cost-of-insurance protection, the IRS in effect allocated the entire acquisition cost
to the insurance-protection component. See also Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2005-04-001
(adopting the same approach). The difficulty with the IRS approach - aside from its
failure to account for its deviation from its published rulings - is that it ignores the
reality that acquisition costs are properly allocable to the policy's investment component
as well as its insurance-protection component.
101. See Regs. § 1.61-22(d)(3); see also IRS Notice 2002-8, 2002-1 C.B. 398
(permitting taxpayers to value the cost-of-insurance protection based on the table
contained in the Notice or the amount charged by the insurance company for term
insurance). In fact, the regulations go on to provide that, as a general rule, a person
paying for the cost-of-insurance protection under a split-dollar arrangement where the
so-called economic benefit regime is applicable may not reflect such payment in
calculating the amount invested in the contract for purposes of Code § 72. See Regs. §
1.61-22(g)(4)(iii). Although the regulation does not address the basis question in the
case of a sale, as distinguished from a surrender, the implication is that payments for
insurance protection should similarly be disregarded in this context.

Florida Tax Review

[Vol 7:9

published guidance, that the policy investment theory should apply in the case of
a policy sale. Given the failings of the aggregate premium theory and the inequity
under current law of discriminating between sales and surrenders, Congress should
amend Code section 72 to incorporate the hypothetical term method and make it
applicable to all predeath policy dispositions.
If Code section 72 is not amended, and taxpayers who surrender their
policies are therefore permitted to continue using the aggregate premium approach
in computing gain, instituting the policy investment theory will be problematic. It
will result not only in inequity but also in distortion. Under the policy investment
theory, taxpayers who sell their policies would be required to reduce basis on
account of the cost-of-insurance protection. Yet taxpayers who surrender their
policies to the insurance company would enjoy a higher basis under the aggregate
premium approach (which is sanctioned under Code section 72(e)). As a result,
similarly situated taxpayers would be treated differently.
Yet, the decision to sell or surrender, in short, should not lead to different
tax outcomes. Moreover, given this difference in treatment, taxpayers might well
feel compelled to surrender a policy even if a sale might command a higher price.
This is tantamount to telling the purchaser of an automobile that the government
will provide her with a tax advantage if, at the time of disposition, she elects to do
a trade-in with the original dealer rather than selling it to a third party. There is no
policy justification for giving the dealer such an advantage. Likewise, there is no
policy justification for taxing a surrender more favorably than a sale and for the
resulting advantage to inure to the underwriting insurance company.
Until Congress resolves the current inequity, the IRS should consider the
second-best strategy outlined in the next section for moving towards universal
application of the hypothetical term method." 2
V. IMPLEMENTING THE HYPOLTHETICAL TERM METHOD DEFERENCE

Having explained why the policy investment theory is superior to the
aggregate premium theory, we now consider the strategies available to the IRS for
implementing the hypothetical term method. Specifically, we focus on how the
courts might respond to the IRS instituting the hypothetical term method given the
IRS's long-standing contrary position.
By way ofbackground, when a government agency administering a statute
issues an interpretation, the courts are required to assess its validity under one of
102. In the absence of an amendment to IRC § 72, the IRS has a difficult
choice. By regulation it can require taxpayers who sell their policies to reduce basis to
account for mortality charges while permitting taxpayers who surrender their policies
to use the aggregate premium approach. Alternatively, it can level the playing field by
permitting selling taxpayers to use the aggregate premium approach. Neither alternative
is ideal, but unless Congress amends IRC § 72, the IRS must choose between one of
these second-best alternatives.
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two standards. 1 3 The more deferential standard, announced by the Supreme Court
in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.," governs in
cases where Congress intended to give the agency authority to issue what the
Supreme Court has called "force-of-law" interpretations and the agency does so in
the appropriate manner.0 5 Under the so-called Chevron standard, an interpretation
will be upheld if two conditions are met: (1) the statute is ambiguous, and (2) the
agency reasonably resolves the ambiguity."° If both of these conditions are met,
a court must defer under this standard even if it is not persuaded that the agency's
interpretation is the best reading of the statute.0 7
Where the Chevron standard does not apply, the validity of the agency's
interpretation is analyzed under the less deferential standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.' Under the so-called Skidmore
standard, an agency interpretation will only be upheld if the court is persuaded that
the agency has correctly read the statute. In determining whether an interpretation
is persuasive, the courts are required under Skidmore to consider a number of
subsidiary factors. For example, if the interpretation is inconsistent with an
interpretation previously adopted by the agency, the court will be less inclined to
find it persuasive. " Similarly, an interpretation issued long after the enactment of
the statute will be viewed as less persuasive than a promptly issued one." 0
Under the Chevron standard, the factors enumerated under the Skidmore
standard are largely irrelevant. As long as the agency has not been arbitrary or
capricious, its interpretation will not be invalidated merely because it has been
inconsistent; indeed, Chevron contemplates that agencies will adjust to evolving
circumstances and will therefore be permitted to change position where
appropriate; furthermore, under Chevron, an agency's delay in issuing an
interpretation will not count against its validity."'
The Tax Court refuses to endorse the Chevron-Skidmore dichotomy, under
which the validity of all agency interpretations are evaluated under one of these
103. See United States v. Mead Corp, 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (summarizing how
much deference courts should afford administrative agencies).
104. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., et al., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
105. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. For example, assuming for the moment that the
IRS were to have the authority to issue interpretations having the force of law, it could
not secure this effect by issuing a private letter ruling. See IRC § 6110.
106. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
107. Id.at 843 n.11.
108. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
109. Id. at 140.
110. See, e.g., Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d
1352, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (importance was given to the agency's contemporaneous
issuance of ruling).
111. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S.
967 (2005); see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996).
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two standards. In Swallows Holding v. Comm 'r,"2 the Tax Court indicated that a
third deference standard may be appropriate in the tax context. Similar to Skidmore
in substance, this standard provides less deference than the Chevron standard. It,
in effect, permits courts to consider Skidmore's subsidiary factors. As such, it could
render vulnerable a myriad of treasury regulations (as well as revoking Revnue
Ruling 70-38).
Should the government seek to implement the hypothetical term method,
it will need to navigate the deference question. Whether the method would be
deemed valid may well depend on the deference standard the courts invoke given
the IRS's long-standing commitment to a different approach; the lack of
contemporaneousness; and Congress's reenactment of the underlying Code section
without disapproving of the IRS's rulings. With each of these factors having
different significance under the different standards, the IRS will have to consider
its options, which include (A) revoking Reverend Ruling 70-38 or (B)
promulgating a new regulation. (as well as revoking Revenue Ruling 70-3 8).
A. Revoke Revenue Ruling 70-38
As an initial step, the IRS should revoke Reverend Ruling 70-38. For, as
long as the ruling remains outstanding, taxpayers will argue that the IRS is
precluded from disavowing it. In a trilogy of recent cases, the Tax Court has held
that the IRS must respect a taxpayer-friendly ruling and may not deviate from it
without first revoking the ruling in question. 113While it remains to be seen whether
other courts will take a similar position," 4 it does seem fundamentally unfair, not
112. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006).
113. Rauenhorst v. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157 (2002), Baker v. Comm'r, 122 T.C.
143 (2004); Dover Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm'r, 122 T.C. 324 (2004). In each ofthe
three cases, the Tax Court emphasized that the IRS adhered to the position in question,
evidenced by private letter rulings where the suspect rulings were referenced.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court framed its analysis in terms of the published rulings, citing
the private letter rulings only to support its reading of the published revenue rulings.
114. Indeed, some courts have suggested that the IRS is not bound by
concessions made in a revenue ruling. See Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436
F.3d 431, 440 (4th Cir. 2006) (intimating a willingness to permit the IRS to disavow a
taxpayer-friendly ruling); Vons Cos., Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 709, 718 (2003)
(in dicta, indicating that the IRS cannot be stopped by a revenue ruling). It should be
noted that, if the IRS were to revoke retroactively a taxpayer-friendly revenue ruling
after the transaction was consummated but before the issue reached the courts, a
different question would be presented. In these circumstances, assuming the revocation
was not an abuse of discretion, the courts might well be inclined to permit the IRS to
disavow the ruling. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965) (permitting
the IRS to disregard a ruling in these circumstances after finding that its revocation was
not an abuse of discretion); but see Estate of McLendon v. Comm'r, 135 F.3d 1017,
1024 n. 15 (5th Cir. 1998) (questioning the viability of this aspect of Dixon given the fact
that the IRS is more unequivocal in inviting taxpayer reliance on revenue rulings and
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to mention inefficient, to permit the IRS to disregard a ruling after having invited
taxpayer reliance. Thus, even though, as evidenced by the publication of several
private letter rulings, the IRS has largely ignored Reverend Ruling 70-38,' it
would seem unlikely that the Tax Court (or other courts) would be receptive to the
hypothetical term method as long as Reverend Ruling 70-38 remains intact.
Although none of the decisions in the trilogy alludes to it, there is a narrow
context in which a taxpayer-friendly ruling cannot bind the IRS. As the Supreme
Court has indicated, where a ruling is contrary to an unambiguous Code provision,
the ruling must yield;" 6 otherwise, constitutional questions might arise. Put
differently, where Congress clearly expresses itself, neither the judicial nor
executive branch can effect an override." 7 It is unlikely that the IRS could, under
this exception, disavow Reverend Ruling 70-38, for it seems very doubtful that a
court could read the Code as unambiguously setting forth a methodology for
computing a life insurance policy's tax basis. Thus, if the IRS should decide to
implement the hypothetical term method, a revocation of Reverend Ruling 70-38
would seem to be an indispensable first step.
A revocation of the ruling would not in itself enable the IRS to claim
deference for its new position. Thus, if such a claim is to be made, published
guidance that affirmatively adopts the hypothetical term method must be issued.
If the IRS were to adopt the method in a new ruling, the courts would likely
analyze it under the Skidmore standard. Although the Supreme Court has not yet
clarified whether Chevron or Skidmore applies to revenue rulings, it is very likely
that the courts will apply Skidmore rather than Chevron in this context." 8 And,
under Skidmore, the courts might well be skeptical about deferring to such a ruling
given the IRS's long-standing contrary position.

distinguishing it on the ground that Dixon involved a ruling that was contrary to an
unambiguous Code section).
115. See, e.g., IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-43-020 (July 22, 1994); and ChiefCouns.
Adv. 2005 04 001 (dated Oct. 12, 2004).
116. Schleier v. Comm'r, 515 U.S. 323, n.9 (1995).
117. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Secretary ofthe Treasury would effectively be empowered to repeal
taxes that the Congress enacts" if a taxpayer-friendly interpretation were upheld, even
if contrary to the Code.); see also Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax
Practice, 36 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 731, 797-98 (2002).
118. The Mead decision can be read as strongly implying that revenue rulings
are to be analyzed under the Skidmore framework. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (discussing the fact that, under the Chevron decision, the Court of
Federal Claims had not been giving any deference to revenue rulings). See also John
Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and
Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 Admin. L. Rev. 39, 89-90 (2003) (indicating that,
under the Mead decision, revenue rulings are reviewed under the Skidmore standard);
Irving Salem et al., Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 Tax Law. 717
(2004) [hereinafter ABA Task Force].
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B. Promulgatea New Regulation
The IRS should consider instituting the hypothetical term method by
promulgating a new regulation." 9 In all likelihood, such a regulation would be
entitled to deference under the Chevron standard and would, as a result, be upheld
in any taxpayer challenge to its validity. Although the Tax Court contemplates the
possibility of a third deference standard, close examination shows that the Tax
Court's approach is not likely to be sustained.
1. ProbableApplication of the Chevron Standard
A new regulation employing the hypothetical term method should easily
satisfy Chevron's two-part test. First, the Code does not address, let alone
unambiguously resolve, the basis-computation question. Second, the hypothetical
term method would appear to effect a reasonable resolution in that it simply creates
an administrable model built on the principle developed by the courts in the context
of computing losses that the cost-of-insurance protection is not to be reflected in
basis. 20
The application of Chevron to a hypothetical term regulation would be
consistent with the Supreme Court's foundational decision delineating the scope
of the Chevron and Skidmore standards in UnitedStates v. Mead.2 ' In Mead, the
Court clarified that it had intended in Chevron to create a dichotomy, requiring all
deference claims to be analyzed under one of these two standards.' 22 The Court
indicated that an interpretation that is subject to Chevron and that passes muster
under this standard is entitled to force-of-law effect.'" In other words, it is treated
as if Congress itself had explicitly authorized it. The force-of-law nomenclature is
119. See generally Philip Gall, Phantom Tax Regulations: The Curse of
Spurned Delegations, 56 Tax Law. 413 (2003) (regulations are the collaborative product
of the Treasury Department and the IRS).
120. In addition, a new regulation should not be viewed as effecting an
arbitrary or capricious change in position. In the context of the recent marketing of new
life insurance products that have substantial potential to result in gain, the IRS must be
given an opportunity to take a fresh look at the question of basis. Indeed, in issuing its
earlier rulings decades ago, the IRS's focus was on the computation of loss as it was
concerned about taxpayers converting nondeductible premiums into a deductible loss.
See supra notes 16-27 and accompanying text. It certainly did not, and could not,
foresee the basis issue in the gain context that it must now confront. See infra § VI.
121. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 218.
122. See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S.Ct. 904, 914-15 (2006). The Court
provides a circular test for determining which standard is to be applied, focusing
principally on whether Congress intended the agency to have the authority to issue a
Chevron-type interpretation. It is circular in the sense that while it nominally makes the
issue turn on Congress's intent, the Court itself must ultimately decide whether
Congress intended to grant such authority in the case of any given agency.
123. Mead, 533 U.S. at 218; see also Gonzales, 126 S.Ct. at 914-15.
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apparently inapt in the Skidmore context because if the interpretation is upheld
under this standard, it is only because the court finds it persuasive, not because the
agency's interpretation is analogous to a mandate from Congress.
2. PossibleApplication ofa Different Deference Standardin Tax Cases
Mead cannot be easily read as contemplating the application of different
deference standards in different areas of specialty. To the contrary, it is a
comprehensive decision that seeks to impose the Chevron-Skidmore dichotomy
across all areas of law involving agency-administered statutes. 24 Nonetheless,
based on the Supreme Court's failure to cite Chevron with consistency in the tax
context, some commentators have suggested that the Court may have contemplated
the use of a third standard in tax cases. 125 Under this view, neither Chevron nor
Skidmore would apply in the case of interpretive tax regulations (i.e., a regulation
issued under the general authority of Code section 7805, as opposed to a regulation
issued under a specific grant of authority contained in the Code section to which
it relates). Rather, regulations would be analyzed under the standard the Supreme
Court announced in NationalMuffler v. Comm 'r, 26 in which the ultimate question
in determining the validity of an interpretive tax regulation is whether it
124. See Kristin E. Hickman, Need for Mead, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1537 (2006)
(arguing that the Chevron-Skidmore dichotomy applies to interpretive tax regulations).
But see Irving Salem, Supreme Court should clarify its Deference Standard, 112 Tax
Notes 1063 (Sept. 18, 2006) (arguing for a different standard in fee tax context). See
also Mitchell Gans, supra note 117 at 749-50; Jonathan Blattmacher, Mitchell Gans, and
Damien Rios, The Circular 230 Desk Book, Ch. 1 (2006).
125. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules
with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467 (2002)
(indicating that the Skidmore standard may apply in the case of interpretive tax
regulations); Coverdale, supra note 118, at 83; (arguing that the Skidmore standard
applies in this context); ABA Task Force, supra note 118 (arguing in favor of using
factors enunciated in Nat'l Muffler v. Comm'r (infra note 126) in assessing the validity
of interpretive tax regulations); Ellen P. Aprill, The Interpretive Voice, 38 Loy. L.A. L.
Rev. 2081 (2005) (same); Noel Cunningham & James Repetti, Textualism and Tax
Shelters, 24 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (2004) (summarizing the dispute); Gregg D. Polsky, Can
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 185 (2004) (noting the dispute);
see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm'r, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 (2001) (noting the
uncertainty); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973,982 (7th Cir.
1998) (discussing the issue); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Comm'r, 41 F.3d 130,
135-36 n.23 (3rd Cir. 1994) (indicating less deference than the Chevron standard would
require is appropriate); Snowa v. Comm'r, 123 F.3d 190, 197 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying
the factors enunciated in Nat'l Muffler v. Comm'r (infra note 126)); Nalle v. Comm'r,
997 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); In re Craddock, 149 F.3d 1249, 1258 (10th
Cir. 1998) (same); Schuler Indus. Inc. v. United States, 109 F.3d 753, 755 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (same).
126. Nat'l Muffler v. Comm'r., 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
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127
"harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose."'
In NationalMuffler, the Court listed various factors that are to be considered in
answering this question: whether the regulation was issued contemporaneously
with the enactment of the statute, whether the regulation is long-standing, whether
there has been taxpayer reliance on the regulation, whether the IRS has been
consistent in its view of the statute, and whether the regulation has
been scrutinized
28
by Congress in any postregulation reenactment of the statute.1
The NationalMuffler standard is substantially similar, if not identical, to
the Skidmore standard. The only difference between the two is that under National
Muffler, the ultimate question is whether there is sufficient harmony between the
regulation and the Code, whereas under Skidmore the ultimate question is whether
the court finds the regulation persuasive 29 Interms of the various subsidiary
factors that are to be considered in answering the ultimate question, it is difficult
to discern any significant difference between the two standards. 3 ' The similarity
is not surprising. After all, as the Court indicated in Mead, Chevron introduced a
new standard that was designed to displace in certain contexts the Skidmore-type
analysis it had implicitly utilized in many of its prior cases. 3' NationalMuffler is
therefore best understood as an iteration of Skidmore.
Despite the Chevron-Skidmore dichotomy articulated in Mead, the Tax
Court in dicta in Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm 'r, ' 2 a nonunanimous courtreviewed decision, has indicated that the National Muffler standard may remain
viable. It then invalidated a regulation on the ground that it could not be sustained
under either the Chevron or NationalMuffler standards.

a. The Tax Court's QuestionableAnalysis
A critical difficulty with the Tax Court's analysis is that, in the course of
maintaining that the regulation would be invalid under either standard, it lost sight
of the fundamental differences between Chevron and the Skidmore-like National
Muffler standard. For example, it emphasized the IRS's lack ofconsistency and the
127. Id. at 476-77.
128. Id.
129. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
130. See id. (referencing as relevant factors whether the agency was
deliberative and engaged in a formal process, whether it was thorough, whether its
reasoning was valid, and whether the agency has been consistent - as well as all other
factors that bear on the question of persuasiveness).
131. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).
132. Swallows Holding, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006). Much, if not all,
of the Court's deference analysis in Swallows Holding is dicta. For once the Court
concluded that the Code was unambiguous, the regulation could not be sustained.
Irrespective of the applicable deference standard, the meaning of an unambiguous
statute cannot be altered by regulation. See General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 599 (2004).
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fact that the regulation was issued long after the enactment of the section. ' While
such failings would have been unquestionably relevant under NationalMuffler, and
would remain relevant were Skidmore the standard, the Supreme Court has made
clear that they play no role under the Chevron standard.'34 Thus, the court not only
reopened the NationalMuffler question, but also misapplied Chevron in forcing the
conclusion that the outcome would have been the same irrespective of the
deference standard.'35
The Tax Court's analysis is troubling at an even more fundamental level
given its failure to grapple with the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the
applicability of Chevron in the tax context. Inexplicably, the majority, as well as
the dissenting opinions, fails to cite the Supreme Court's decision in Central
Laborers'PensionFundv. Heinz, 36 where the Court attributed force-of-law effect
to an interpretive tax regulation. 137 While the Central Laborers' Pension Fund
decision does not cite Chevron, or any other deference standard, the Court
nonetheless implicitly invoked it. 3 ' For, as Mead makes clear, force-of-law effect
is only granted under the Chevron standard. CentralLaborers' Pension Fund,

moreover, dismissed as irrelevant the IRS's inconsistency, further indicating that
the Court implicity applied Chevron in that an agency interpretation entitled to
force-of-law effect is not weakened by the agency's inconsistency. 139 Thus, given
the Court's grant of force-of-law effect to an interpretive tax regulation in Central

133. Id. at 137.
134. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.) N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (under the
Chevron standard, upholding the validity of a regulation issued 100 years after the
enactment of the underlying statute despite the fact that the agency had maintained
inconsistent positions about the meaning of the statute); see also Gans supra note 117,
at 754-55.
135. The court's misunderstanding of how the Chevron standard applies is also
evident when it implies that less deference is appropriate when an agency construes
statutory language that is not grounded in that agency's technical expertise. See
Swallows Holding, 126 T.C. 96, at 144 (making this distinction and referring to
constructions that are not based on expertise as "perfunctory"). The court fails to
recognize that the Chevron decision effected a critical shift. Prior to Chevron, a critical
justification for deference was agency expertise. Under the Chevron decision, however,
agencies are entitled to deference for an entirely separate reason: the executive branch,
unlike the judicial branch, is politically accountable, making it the more appropriate
forum for resolving doubts about the meaning of statutes. See generally Gans, supra
note 117. Thus, in suggesting that agency interpretations not based on technical
expertise are deserving of less deference, the court misunderstands Chevron'smeaning.
136. Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739 (2004).
137. Id. at 748.
138. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
139. CentralLaborers'PensionFund, 541 U.S. at 748. This, ofcourse, further

confirms the Court's application of Chevron in that the IRS's inconsistency could not
have been so dismissed under National Muffler (or Skidmore).
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Laborers' Pension Fund,"4 it would appear that the court in Swallows Holding

erred in refusing to abandon the National Muffler standard and the Skidmore-like
analysis it produces. 4'
b. The Tax Court's Failureto Appreciate Chevron's Breadth

The Swallows Holdingcourt also fails to address properly two important
developments that stem from Chevron: agencies are to be given more latitude to
change their interpretations even if Congress has reenacted the underlying statute,
and, second, unless the statute is unambiguous, agencies are at liberty to overrule
court decisions.
First, the court failed to recognize that the Chevron decision had a subtle,
yet important, impact on the reenactment doctrine. Under the doctrine, where an
agency has issued an interpretation or the courts have reached a consensus about
the meaning of a statute, Congress's reenactment may be viewed as a ratification
of the earlier construction. 4 2 The Swallows Holding court ultimately rested its
decision on this doctrine, concluding that the statute's reenactment in effect ratified
the pre-reenactment decisions. 4 3 As a result, according to the court, the Code
section was rendered sufficiently unambiguous so as to make a regulation adopting
a different approach invalid.
This analysis ignores, however, a critical aspect of Chevron's meaning:
while the reenactment doctrine may be used to validate (ratify) an agency
interpretation or court decision, it may not be used to undermine Chevron'spolicy
140. The interpretive regulation before the Court in CentralLaborers'Pension
Fund related to a section of ERISA (Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Title 26 and 29 of the Code)) as the dispute involved
a nontax, pension issue. Nonetheless, as the Court indicated, the same provision appears
in the Code verbatim, and, according to the Court, the regulation is to be applied for tax,
Fund,541 U.S. at 748 n.4.
as well as pension, purposes. See CentralLaborers'Pension
Indeed, in granting force-of-law effect to the regulation, the Court indicates that when
issuing an interpretive regulation under IRC § 7805, the IRS speaks in its "most
authoritative voice," see Central Laborers' Pension Fund, 541 U.S. at 748, further
confirming that such regulations are to be reviewed under the Chevron standard.
141. Indeed, in the Mead decision itself, the Court cited Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Comm 'r,523 U.S. 382 (1998), as an example of an earlier case in which the Chevron
standard had been properly applied. Since Atlantic Mutual involved an interpretive tax
regulation, the Mead decision leaves little doubt that the Court contemplates the
application of the Chevron standard in this context. See Mead,533 U.S. at 230. See also
United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380 (1999) (indicating that the Chevron
standard is applicable when a question concerning the Code arises in the Tax Court).
142. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 Mich.
L. Rev. 67 (1988) (discussing the reenactment doctrine); Gans, supra note 117, at 76475; Robert C. Brown, Regulations, Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 Harv. L.
Rev. 377 (1941) (critiquing the doctrine).
143. See Swallows Holding v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006).
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favoring agency flexibility.'" Under Chevron, in other words, reenactment can
expand an agency's ability to claim deference for interpretation while not
necessarily contracting its ability to change position: (1) An agency can invoke the
reenactment doctrine in instances when Congress reenacts a statute after an agency
or court has construed it, based on the inference that Congress approved of the
construction; and (2) an agency can only be precluded from changing its position
under the doctrine if it can be determined that Congress unambiguously indicated
an intent in reenacting the section to freeze in place the outstanding
interpretation."' Had the court in Swallows Holdingapplied Chevron, rather than

denying the differences between the Chevron and pre-Chevron standards, it
presumably would have reached a different conclusion about the validity of the
regulation after first focusing on the correct issue: whether, in reenacting the
section, Congress had unambiguously expressed an intent to make the existing
precedent unalterable."4
Second, as recently embellished, Chevron permits an agency to overrule
judicial precedent. In National Cable & TelecommunicationsAss 'n v. BrandX

Internet Services,147 the Supreme Court held that an agency interpretation issued
under Chevron may overrule a court decision, even including a Supreme Court
1 48
decision, provided that the court did not hold the statute to be unambiguous.
Thus, under the National Cable framework, unless a statute is held
unambiguous, 49 the government can convert its defeat in court into victory by
144. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct.
2688, 2708 (2005).
145. Id.
146. Lest there be any confusion, the court's attempt in Swallows Holding to
make National Cable inapplicable in the tax context is not directly relevant to the
validity of a proposed regulation adopting the hypothetical term method. Unlike the
interpretation in NationalCable (or Swallows Holding), the proposed regulation would
not overturn a court decision; it would merely overturn the IRS's own ruling. The
court's analysis of NationalCable is nonetheless indirectly relevant in it that it reflects
the Tax Court's unwillingness to embrace Chevron and all of its implications.
147. National Cable, 125 S. Ct. at 2688. See Lee A. Sheppard, Tax Court
Flunks the Brand X Test, 110 Tax Notes 585 (Feb. 6, 2006) (pointing out that the Tax
Court overlooked the importance of the National Cable decision). See also Stan R.
Johnson, Swallows as it Might Have Been: Regulations Reversing Case Law, 112 Tax
Notes 773 (Aug. 28, 2006) (critiquing Swallows Holding on the grounds that it fails to
follow National Cable). But see Richard M. Lipton, A Divided Tax Court Rejects a
Regulation and Struggles with Administrative Law - In Swallows Holding, 104 J. Tax'n
260 (2006) (arguing that the Swallows Holding court reached the correct result).
148. See National Cable, 125 S. Ct. at 2700 ("A court's prior judicial
construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.").
149. For a discussion of National Cable, see Note, Implementing Brand X:
What Counts as a Step One Holding? 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1532 (2006).
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regulation and thereby render a court nothing more than a provisional decision
maker. Presumably concerned about its new role, the Tax Court struggled, not
surprisingly, to adopt a reading of National Cable that would preclude it from
applying in tax cases.150
How did Swallows Holdingsupport this reading? Building on its premise
that interpretive tax regulations may not be subject to the Chevron standard, the
Swallows Holdingcourt questioned whether NationalCablecould ever be applied
to such regulations, given thatNationalCable involved a Chevron interpretation.' 5 '
Furthermore, the Swallows Holdingcourt implicitly used a collateral-estoppel type
analysis in its attempt to limit the application of National Cable, maintaining that
an agency can only overturn a court decision if it was not a party in the prior
litigation. 5 2 More specifically, in National Cable,the agency had not been a party
in the prior litigation; in contrast, when it comes to tax litigation, the IRS will
always be a party. As a consequence, under Swallows Holding,the IRS will always
be precluded from administratively overturning an unfavorable decision.
In advancing these arguments, the Tax Court misreads the Supreme Court.
It is difficult to assert that the Supreme Court contemplated the application of a
third, unique deference standard in tax cases. It is likewise difficult to find even the
hint of a suggestion in NationalCablethat tax regulations are to be excluded from
150. See Gans (exploring mindset ofTax Court Judges), supra note 117, at 780.
See also Aprill (exploring mindset of Tax Court Judges), supra note 125 at 2111-12.
151. Swallows Holding v. Comm'r, 126 T.C. 96 (2006).
152. Id. at 144-45. It should be noted that there may be limits on an agency's
ability under National Cable to trump the courts. In General Dynamics Land Systems,
Inc. v. Cline 540 U.S. 581 (2004), the Court relied on a lower-court consensus in
reaching the conclusion that the statute was unambiguous (indicating as well that
Congress' failure to overturn the consensus view could be read as acquiescence). See
id. at 593-94. See also Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota) N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996)
(indicating that disagreement in the lower courts suggested that the statute was
ambiguous). Thus, assuming that a widely shared consensus develops, the agency may,
as a practical matter, forfeit its ability to take a different approach by regulation.
Whether the lower-court consensus in Swallows Holding, consisting of the Fourth
Circuit's agreement with the Board of Tax Appeals, is sufficient to satisfy the widelyshared-consensus criterion remains questionable in that, in General Dynamics, the Court
relied on a series of uniform decisions in two circuits courts and numerous district
courts as well as an analysis in its own earlier decisions. See id. Surprisingly, the Tax
Court in Swallows Holding fails to cite General Dynamics. Questions also remain about
General Dynamics itself. Consider, for example, a statute that is construed in a similar
fashion by different courts, with each successive decision adopting the reasoning of the
first decision as a matter of stare decisis. Does the agreement among the courts suggest
that the statute is unambiguous or, rather, that courts may, at least in close cases, tend
to agree with each other? Finally, it is noteworthy that General Dynamics gives agencies
an odd incentive: to overturn an unfavorable court decision quickly in order to avoid the
risk that a consensus might develop, rather than taking time to reflect on the issue before
promulgating a regulation.
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its framework. Absent some indication from Congress that the IRS should be
singled out in this fashion, the Supreme Court should not be lightly understood as
having intended to create unstated, tax-specific exceptions to the administrative law
framework it has established. In short, there is no basis in any of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions to justify such an exception.'53
153. The Swallows Holdingcourt also emphasized, in seeking to limit National
Cable, the fact that the IRS had not consistently maintained the position taken in the
new regulation. Swallows Holding, 126 T.C. No. 6 at 144. But the majority failed to
acknowledge that the Court in NationalCable also indicated that Chevron contemplates
that agencies can freely change their position as circumstances warrant and that, unless
they are arbitrary or capricious, the inconsistency does not undermine the validity of the
new interpretation. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2700 (2005).
As suggesterd in text, many regulations promulgated for the purpose of
overturning court decisions will become vulnerable ifthe Tax Court's failure to embrace
National Cable is sustained. The most recent example is a proposed regulation that
would substantially alter the income tax treatment of private annuities. See Prop Treas.
Reg. § 1.72-6 and § 1.1001-1, 71 Fed Reg. 61441-01 (Oct. 18, 2006). In the preamble,
the Treasury explains that the approach taken in a 1933 Board of Tax Appeals decision
that was based on Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), as well as the approach taken
in Rev. Rul 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, cannot be followed if taxpayer abuse is to be
prevented. See id. Whereas this proposal would, in all likelihood, be invalidated if the
Swallows Holding analysis were applied, it would unquestionably be sustained under
National Cable inasmuch as the neither IRC § 1001 nor § 72 unambiguously resolves
the issues addressed in the proposal.
Note, however, that in Estate of Gerson v. Comm'r, 127 T.C. No 11 (2006),
decided just before publication of this article, the court sustained a generation skipping
tax regulation designed to overturn circuit court precedent. Adhering to its decision in
Swallows Holding, the court applied the National Muffler standard rather than Chevron,
indicating, as it did in Swallows Holding, that the result would be the same under either
standard and that there was therefore no need to compare the two standards. In terms of
National Cable, without acknowledging its shift, the court deviated from Swallows
Holding. It concluded that, under the National Cable framework, where the courts are
in conflict about the meaning of a Code section, an interpretive regulation can resolve
the conflict. Thus, unlike Swallows Holding, Gerson contemplates that National Cable
can apply to interpretive tax regulations. Unfortunately, however, Gerson fails to
recognize that only a Chevron-type interpretation can overturn a court decision. See
National Cable, 125 S. Ct. at 2701 (indicating that "the court's prior ruling remains
binding law" in the case of an "agency interpretation to which Chevron is
inapplicable"). Thus, it would seem that the court erred not only in failing to apply the
National Cable framework in Swallows Holding, but also in failing to appreciate in
Gerson that a non-Chevron (National Muffler) regulation cannot be used to overturn a
court decision. Unless the Tax Court embraces Chevron, it will eventually have to
confront the reality that, under National Cable, a non-Chevron regulation cannot
interfere with precedent. In short, the Tax Court must choose between two inconsistent
propositions that it advances in Gerson: that Chevron may not apply to interpretive tax
regulations and that interpretive tax regulations can overturn precedent. For a discussion
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This is not to suggest that, as a matter of policy, such an exception would
be inappropriate. Indeed, given the IRS's interest in vindicating itself after
sustaining a defeat in court, one might question whether it would be salutary to
permit the government to convert its losses into victory by regulation. " However,
unless Congress decides to create a special regime for tax interpretations, the
National Cableframework appears to apply to all agencies issuing interpretations
under the Chevron standard.
The IRS must, at the very least, revoke Reverend Ruling 70-38. It might
then adopt the hypothetical term method in a new ruling. However, given the low
level of deference such a ruling would receive, the IRS should incorporate the
hypothetical term method in a new regulation. Under a proper application of
Chevron, the regulation would be virtually invulnerable to challenge. As the
Supreme Court recently reiterated in NationalCable, Chevron contemplates that,
over time, agencies be permitted the flexibility to change position. Thus, the IRS's
long-standing commitment should not preclude it from changing course. Nor
should Congress's reenactment of the underlying sections be viewed as a
ratification that freezes the IRS's prior rulings in place. Unless Congress has
unambiguously directed that an interpretation not be changed, a court operating
under the Chevron standard must respect the new interpretation. Given the need for
guidance prompted by the recent marketing of life insurance products creating the
potential for gain' 55 and given the low standard that agencies must meet when
changing position (i.e., not arbitrary or capricious), the regulation should be easily
upheld.
If, on the other hand, the Tax Court persists in applying a Skidmore-like
standard in considering interpretive regulations, the proposed regulation would
obviously face a more difficult challenge, at least in the Tax Court: Under such a
standard, the IRS's long-standing position, maintained both before and after the
amendment of the underlying Code sections, would cut strongly against the validity
of a newly issued regulation. Should other courts decide to follow Swallows
Holding, a raft of treasury regulations would become similarly vulnerable.' 56

of the deference issues with regard to the generation skipping tax regulation sustained
by the court in Gerson, see Gans supra note 117.
154. Timothy K Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13
Comell J. Law & Pub. Pol'y 203 (2004) (arguing that self-interested agencies should
not receive Chevron deference). But see Hickman, supra note 124 (arguing that
deference should be afforded to the IRS).
155. See infra Part VI.
156. See, e.g., Regs. § 1.61-22. The split-dollar regulations also replaced a
contrary revenue ruling. In Rev. Rul. 64-328, 1964-2 C.B. 11, made obsolete by Rev.
Rul. 2003-105, the IRS made no distinction between the so-called collateral assignment
and endorsement methods. In the split-dollar regulations that replaced this ruling,
however, two different regimes apply depending on which method is used. See Regs.
§§ 1.61-22 & 1.7872-15.

2006]

A New Modelfor Identifying Basis in Life Insurance

In the end, the more likely outcome is that the Supreme Court's Chevron
mandate will eventually come to be seen as having universal application. In short,
Swallows Holding is less likely to survive than the regulation it invalidated.

VI. DISPOSMONS OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
As a matter of policy, Congress has historically promoted the purchase of
life insurance. This proinsurance bias is reflected in the tax-favored treatment given
to life insurance policies and proceeds.157
In general, taxpayers who own life insurance policies may hold them to
maturity, let them lapse, or dispose of them. Consistent with its policy objectives
of promoting life insurance ownership, Congress offers very favorable tax
treatment to taxpayers who hold their life insurance policies to maturity: when it

157. Examples of such favoritism are reflected in the fact that the internal
buildup of the cash value of a life insurance policy is not taxed (see, e.g., Cohen v.
Comm'r, 39 T.C. 1055 (1963), acq., 1964-1 C.B. 4 (cash value of policy was deemed
not constructively received by taxpayer because to receive such value, the taxpayer
would have to surrender the policy)), and life insurance policy proceeds are entirely
exempt from income tax. IRC § 101(a). These benefits do not come without a price,
however; put in terms of dollars, this so-called "tax expenditure" costs the country's
coffers billions annually. See, e.g., GAO Report, Governmental Performance and
Accountability: Tax Expenditures Represent a Substantial Federal Commitment and
Need to Be Reexamined, GAO-05-690, tbl. 2 at 34 (Sept. 2005) (shows a revenue loss
estimate of $20.1 billion for fiscal year 2004 associated with the income tax exclusion
on interest with respect to life insurance savings). From a public policy perspective,
query whether a portion of this expenditure was ever intended to benefit those taxpayers
who, at some point, seek to sell (or even surrender) their coverage.
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comes to the receipt of policy distributions, 5 ' loans, 5 9 and withdrawals, 6 °
Congress specifically allows taxpayers to use the aggregate premiums they have
paid to shelter these proceeds from tax.
Taxpayers who no longer need or can afford to maintain their life
insurance polices and allow them to lapse usually face one of two consequences.
On the one hand, if the policy has no outstanding loans, the lapsing event will
engender no income tax repercussions. On the other hand, if the policy is subject
to outstanding loans, allowing the policy to lapse will be treated as a disposition
event.'" '
Congress's magnanimous spirit towards the tax treatment of life insurance
extends to policy surrenders. For reasons unexplained, the surrender of a life
insurance policy enjoys extraordinarily favorable (and, as a matter of policy,
undeserved) tax treatment.'62 Taxpayers who surrender their policies do not
recognize income as long as the amount received does not exceed the aggregate
158. All dividends paid or credited before the maturity or surrender of a
contract are deemed a tax-free return of basis. IRC § 72(e)(5). The Code mandates that
for these purposes, the term basis means aggregate basis and includes all premium
payments. IRC § 72(e)(6).
As a corollary to this tax-free treatment reserved for dividends (assuming the
dividends received do not exceed aggregate premium payments), the taxpayer must
reduce the tax basis in the policy that generated such dividends. Regs. § 1.72-6. If,
instead, these dividends are used to pay policy premiums, or, alternatively, they are used
to purchase additional insurance, such payments will have no net effect upon the
policy's tax basis.
159. Ordinarily a loan taken on a policy does not generate taxable income. See
generally, Woodsom Assocs., Inc. v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952) (holding that
the act of borrowing does not constitute a recognition event). A policy loan thus has no
bearing upon the tax basis taxpayers have in their insurance policies. The issue of
consequence will be if the loan in question is still outstanding at the time the policy is
surrendered or sold; in either case, the taxpayer is treated as if the borrowed (and still
unpaid) sums were received. Atwood v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1999-61.
160. For tax purposes, a policy withdrawal is treated as a cash distribution and
is generally protected from tax until the aggregate amount withdrawn exceeds the
aggregate premiums paid by a taxpayer. IRC § 72(e)(6). However, amounts withdrawn
correspondingly decrease a taxpayer's tax basis in the policy. Regs. § 1.72-6. This
general rule does not apply, for example, if the benefits under a life insurance contract
are reduced during the fifteen-year period beginning on the issue date of the contract,
and a cash distribution is made to the policyholder as a result of the reduction in
benefits. See IRC § 7702(0(7).
161. See Regs. § 1.1001-2(a) (the amount of the loan is considered an amount
received on the transfer); IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-056 (Sept. 27, 1989) (same).
162. To provide an incentive for taxpayers to maintain their policies, Congress
should consider eliminating any favorable tax treatment associated with policy
surrenders and, in particular, repealing IRC § 72(e)(6). Indeed, it might even consider
going a step further and instituting an excise tax in instances of policy surrenders to
capture some of the income tax deferral the taxpayers are able to capitalize upon.

20061

A New Modelfor Identifying Basis in Life Insurance

premiums each of these taxpayers paid.'63 (If,however, the cash surrender value
exceeds the aggregate premiums paid, such excess is taxable.) I"
The same favorable tax treatment does not extend to other life insurance
policy dispositions. This is when proper basis identification is most critical. Today,
there are several reasons why the disposition of life insurance policies has become
increasingly popular. One reason is the emergence of life settlement companies,
and another is that a new premium financing technique has arisen that makes the
sale of life insurance policies much more attractive.
A. The Emergence of the Life Settlement Companies
Over the past decade the sale of life insurance policies has surged. There
are several reasons for this trend.
One reason is that an increasingly greater percentage of the nation's
population is over sixty-five.1 61 People in this demographic often attempt to
supplement their incomes and maximize economic returns on whatever assets they
own. Life insurance policies with an investment component that are performance
laggards are thus potential targets for taxpayers in this demographic to sell.
Another reason taxpayers may seek to sell their life insurance policies is
that their insurance needs have become obviated. This may occur due to family
changes or business transitions. More specifically, in the family context, taxpayers
often purchase life insurance to help fund college educations or to provide for the
financial needs of their family. At a certain point, however, the taxpayers' children
may have completed their formal educations and taxpayers may have accumulated
sufficient assets to meet their present and anticipated future financial obligations,
thereby negating their insurance needs. In the business context, key employees
upon whom the employer held policies may quit, be terminated, or retire. Any of
the foregoing events may result in taxpayers owning life insurance policies that no
longer serve any utility.
A final reason that taxpayers may deem retention of their life insurance
policies unnecessary is that Congress has greatly alleviated the federal estate tax
burden that used to haunt many taxpayers. In prior decades, a leading reason for
the purchase of life insurance was to offset an anticipated federal estate tax burden.
In the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 200 1,1" however,
Congress dramatically increased the applicable exclusion amount,"' i.e., the
amount taxpayers can shelter from the federal estate tax. Currently, this amount is

163. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
164. IRC § 61.
165. Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, tbl. 34 at 38 (2006).
166. Economic Growth and Tax ReliefReconciliation Act of200 1,Pub. L. No.
107-16, 115 Stat. 38.
167. Id. at 71.
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$2 million, but it is scheduled to increase to $3.5 million in 2009.16m (In2010, the
federal estate is scheduled to be suspended, and in 2011 the applicable exclusion
amount is scheduled to be reduced to $1 million. 69 However, most commentators
doubt that either the full repeal of the estate tax or a reduction of the applicable
exclusion amount will ever actually occur.) 7 ° In addition, as part of the same
legislation, the federal estate tax rate is scheduled to decrease in the coming years
from the prior 55 percent maximum tax rate to a maximum tax rate of 45
percent.' The combination of a significantly higher exclusion amount and a much
lower tax rate alleviates much of the potential federal estate tax burden that many
taxpayers once faced, mooting their need to maintain life insurance policies as a
means of offsetting this perceived erstwhile burden.
In the past, when taxpayers owned life insurance policies that they no
longer needed, they were essentially presented with an either/or choice: they could
either let the policy lapse, or they could surrender the policy for its cash surrender
value. The AIDS epidemic, however, had a profound effect on this either/or choice,
opening up a third option: taxpayers now have the opportunity to sell their life
insurance policies to the company offering the highest bid.
At the start ofthe AIDS epidemic in the early 1980s, the medical industry
was scrambling to learn about the disease and its treatment. Medical treatment and
care were scarce and costly; taxpayers who suffered from AIDS were anxious for
both and sought to sell their life insurance policies as a means to cover such
expenses. This financial need was the catalyst behind the advent of viatical
companies."'
168. Id. See generally Dennis L. Belcher & Mary Louise Fellows, Report on
Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes Task Force on Federal Wealth Transfer
Taxes, 58 Tax Law. 93 (2004) (describing in exhaustive detail that if facets of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 are made permanent, it
will dramatically decrease the percentage of estates subject to federal estate tax).
169. See Pub. L. No. 107-16, supra note 137, at § 901, 115 Stat. 150
(prescribing "sunset" provisions for estate tax repeal).
170. See, e.g., Edward McCaffery, A Look Into the Future of Estate Tax
Reform, 105 Tax Notes 997 (Nov. 15, 2004) (arguing that politicians use the prospect
of estate tax repeal to generate campaign contributions); Edward McCaffery & Linda
Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: A Tale of Death, Money and Taxes, in USC CLEO
Research Paper No. 04-14 (2004), at http://ssm.com/abstract=581084 (same).
171. See Pub. L. No. 107-16, supra note 133, §51 l(a)-(c), 115 Stat. 38,70-71.
172. The business model of viatical companies was fairly simple. These
companies would buy life insurance policies at a discounted value from patients stricken
with AIDS, who were deemed to have exceedingly short life spans; maintain the policy
until the death of the insured; and give company investors a healthy return on their
investments. Commentators estimate that "between $1.8 billion and $4.0 billion worth
of policies were viaticated in 2001, up from $50 million in 1990 and $1.0 billion as
recently as 1999." N.A. Doherty & H.J. Singer, The Benefit of a Secondary Market for
Life Insurance Policies, 38 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 449, 451 (2003) (citing Erich W.
Sippel & Alan H. Buerger, A Free Market for Life Insurance, Contingencies 17 (Mar.-
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The "problem" that arose in the viatical company industry is that new
AIDS treatments prolonged life, making investments in insurance policies on the
lives of AIDS patients far less economically attractive than when the epidemic first
began.' 73 To survive economically, viatical companies gradually changed their
business model, transforming themselves into so-called life settlement companies.
The business model of life settlement companies shares many of the same
attributes of viatical companies. There is, however, one essential difference
between the two kinds of companies: whereas viatical companies purchase life
insurance policies when death is imminent, life settlement companies do not. In the
case of life settlement companies, the insured ordinarily has a health ailment (e.g.,
cancer) that materially decreases the insured's life expectancy. This condition
usually makes the value of the life insurance policy on the insured's life worth far
in excess of the policy's cash surrender value.
Over the last ten years, the life settlement industry has evolved and has
become more respected in the business community. Such respect has further
contributed to the dramatic increase in the number of life insurance policies sold
annually. The life settlement industry projects rapid growth, anticipating a
tremendous rise in its revenues over the next decade. 74
B. Premium FinancingTechnique

The emergence of the life settlement industry has fostered the
establishment of several new estate planning techniques. One popular technique
involves premium financing, in which the insured acquires a new policy with funds
advanced by an investor.175 Albeit somewhat oversimplified, here are the
Apr. 2002); Carrie Coolidge, Death Wish Investors in Insurance Policies for the
Terminally Ill Are Watching Their Capital Get Annihilated, Forbes 206 (Mar. 19,
2001)).
173. D.W. Dunlap, AIDS Drugs Alter an Industry's Math, N.Y. Times, July
30, 1995, at DI; Coolidge, supra note 172.
174. See Jim Connolly, Institutions Reshape Life Settlement Market, National
Underwriter 14 (Sept. 20, 2004) (estimating that the volume of life settlements will
increase to $15 billion annually by the year 2010); M. Bryan Freeman, Life Settlements
Enter the Mainstream, Nat'l Underwriter 20 (Sept. 19, 2005) (declaring that the life
settlement market has come of age). But see Rachel Emma Silverman, Recognizing Life
Insurance's Value: Study Says Keeping Policy May Mean Bigger Payoff Than Selling
to an Investor, Wall St. J., May 31, 2005, at D2.
175. Some states have questioned the legality of this technique. See, e.g., Op.
Off. Gen. Counsel, 05-12-15 (Dec. 19, 2005) (holding that the owner of the policy did
not have a valid insurable interest). Insurance companies, too, have expressed
misgivings regarding the premium financing technique because they apparently price
policies based upon an assumption that a number of the policies will lapse before the
insured dies. Those who invest in this type of transaction seek to exploit this
assumption, acquiring the policy at a reduced cost because of the assumption and then
holding it until the insured's death without lapse.
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technique's salient attributes: an investor seeks a healthy elderly participant who
has significant wealth and can secure a large life insurance policy, say in the $5
million range. To entice the participant to partake in this arrangement, the investor
promises to pay the policy's premiums for a period of two years. In return, the
participant issues a nonrecourse note to the investor secured by the policy. If the
participant dies during the first two years of the arrangement, the amount of the
advance is repaid to the investor with interest; the participant's beneficiaries retain
the proceeds to the extent such proceeds exceed the amount of the debt.
Alternatively, if the participant is still alive at the end of the two-year term, the
participant must decide whether (i) to retain the policy and repay the debt or (ii) to
forfeit the policy to the investor in satisfaction of the debt.
From an economic perspective, the arrangement is attractive to both the
participant and the investor. In terms of the participant, should death occur within
the two-year period, her beneficiaries enjoy a windfall. And even if the participant
is fortunate enough to still be alive at the end of the two-year period, the participant
has no downside economic risk insofar as premium financing was conducted on
a nonrecourse basis. In terms of the investor, the transaction is also profitable: if the
participant's death occurs during the two-year inception period, the investor
recoups the amount invested together with the interest provided for in the note; at
the end of the two-year inception period, the investor may be repaid or acquire the
policy, the latter of which is apparently a valuable investment in the life settlement
industry because of the underwriting insurance company's failure to price the
policy appropriately.'76
From a tax perspective, however, the participant does have a downside risk
both in terms of the amount of gain the taxpayer recognizes as well as its character.
1. Determiningthe Amount of the Taxable Gain
If the participant survives the two-year inception period and chooses to
forfeit the policy to the investor rather than repaying the debt, the participant must
recognize gain equal to the difference between the amount of the debt and the
participant's basis in the policy.' 77 Depending on the computation of the policy's
tax basis, the potential tax liability on this gain could, in many cases, dissuade the
participant from entering into the arrangement.
If the methodology used by the IRS in its private letter rulings were
applied in this context, the participant's basis would likely be very low at the twoyear point - indeed, near zero - since most of the premium is typically devoted to
acquisition costs during the policy's early years and would be viewed by the IRS
176. See R. Marshall, Stephen R. Leimberg, and Lawrence J. Rybka, 'Free'
Life Insuarnce: Risks and Costs or Non-Recourse Providing Financing, 33 Est. Plan. 3
(2006); Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: Killing the Goose That
Lays the Golden Eggs! 49 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 93 (2005); Rachel Emma Silverman,
Letting an Investor Bet on When You'll Die, Wall St. J., May 26, 2005, at D1.
177. See Regs. § 1.1001-2.
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as a cost-of-insurance.' If, on the other hand, the hypothetical term method were
applied, the basis in the policy would be somewhat greater and the gain
correspondingly reduced. In contrast, under the aggregate premium approach, the
policy's tax basis would likely be sufficient to eliminate all of the participant's
gain. Thus, the attractiveness, if not the feasibility, of the premium financing
technique may well depend on the basis-computation question.'79
2. The Characterof the Gain

A transfer of the policy to the investor in discharge ofthe nonrecourse note
should result in gain, not ordinary cancellation-of-debt (COD) income. In
anticipation of the Supreme Court's decision in Comm 'r v. Tufts, 8 ' regulations
were adopted that make a distinction between recourse and nonrecourse debt. 8 ' In
the case of recourse debt (which is not typically used in the premium financing
arrangement), an allocation between COD income and gain must be made based
on the value of the asset at the time of surrender: 182 to the extent that the amount
ofthe recourse note exceeds the asset's value, COD income is generated, with the
balance constituting gain.' in contrast, in the case of nonrecourse debt, the entire
difference between the amount ofthe debt and the taxpayer's basis is gain." 4Thus,
a taxpayer who engages in a premium financing transaction via a nonrecourse note
will not recognize COD income on account of a transfer of the policy in discharge
of the note.
We turn now to the question of characterizing the gain. On first
examination, one might be inclined to view the gain resulting from the taxpayer's
satisfaction of the nonrecourse note as capital in nature. After all, the Code does not
specifically exclude life insurance policies from the definition of capital assets, 85
178. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
179. This is not to suggest merely because the hypothetical term method
produces less gain that it is theoretically superior. Instead, its theoretical superiority
stems from the more realistic allocation of origination costs. In short, the point of
examining this new arrangement is not to praise the comparative virtues of any basiscomputation method, but simply to explore the practical implications of the different
alternatives.
180. 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
181. See Regs. § 1.1001-2(c), exs. 7, 8. See also Deborah A Geier, Tufts and
the Evolution of Debt Discharge Theory, 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 115 (1992) (critiquing this
distinction).
182. Assume a taxpayer's basis is zero and that it is encumbered by a recourse
debt in the amount of $7,500. If, at a time when the asset's value is $6,000, the taxpayer
surrenders it to the lender in discharge of the entire debt of $7,500, the taxpayer would
have gain of $6,000 and COD income of $1,500. See Regs. § 1.1001-2(c), ex. 8. (using
a similar example).
183. See Regs. § 1.1001-2(c), ex. 7.
184. See Regs. § 1.1001-2(c), ex. 7.
185. See IRC § 1221.
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thus suggesting that they qualify as a capital asset.'86 In terms of the sale-orexchange requirement, which is another precondition of capital gain treatment, a
transfer of the policy to the investor in discharge of the note will suffice." 7
Parenthetically, even a surrender of the policy to the insurance company would be
treated as a sale,"s for the Code now deems contract terminations a sale for capital
gain purposes. 8 9
Nonetheless, upon closer examination, capital gain treatment appears to
be inappropriate. Under an inveterate line of Supreme Court decisions, capital gain
treatment is denied where the amount received is a substitute for ordinary
income.'90 In the face of questions about the continuing viability of the so-called
substitution of income doctrine in light of intervening developments,' 9' the lower
courts have been resolute in continuing to apply the doctrine. " To be sure,
questions do remain as to doctrine's exact boundaries. Nonetheless, the Supreme
186. See Comm'r v. Phillips, 275 F.2d 33, 36 n.3 (4th Cir. 1960) (in dicta,
indicating that a policy may be characterized as a capital asset); see also Tech. Adv.
Mem. 200452033 (Sept. 27, 2004) (same).
187. See Regs. § 1.1001-2.
188. Whereas, traditionally, capital gain treatment could only be secured if the
asset were sold, the Code now permits such treatment even where the asset is
surrendered on termination of a contract. See IRC § 1234A. Thus, it would seem that
if the insured were to surrender a policy to the insurance company, capital gain
treatment might be available. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 200452033 (Sept. 27, 2004)
(indicating that capital gain treatment might be appropriate on surrender of a policy).
189. See IRC 1234A. Even ifthe sale or exchange is satisfied, to the extent the
sale proceeds are attributable to the accretion of earnings within the policy, ordinary
income treatment is the result under the substitution doctrine. See, e.g., Tech. Adv.

Mem. 200452033 (Sept. 27,2004) (indicating that the substitution doctrine requires that
the accretion be treated as ordinary income).
190. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965); Comm'r
v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130 (1960); Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356
U.S. 260 (1958); Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
191. See, e.g., Edward J. Roche, Jr., Lease Cancellation Payments Are Capital
Gain? Yes! The TRA '97 Change to 1234A Overturned Hort, 102 J. Tax'n 364 (2005)
(suggesting that Congress overruled the substitution doctrine in enacting Code §
1234A); see also Lattera v. Comm'r, 437 F.3d 399, 403 (3rd Cir. 2006) (rejecting the
taxpayer's argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Ark. Best Corp. v. Comm'r,
485 United States 212 (1988), overruled the doctrine); United States v. Maginnis, 356
F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
192. See, e.g., Maginnis, 356 F.3d at 1185 (rejecting the taxpayer's argument
that the Supreme Court in Arkansas Best overruled the substitution doctrine); Lattera,
437 F.3d at 403; Watkins v. Comm'r, 447 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying
the substitution doctrine without discussing Arkansas Best); Wolman v. Comm'r, No.
05-9001, 2006 WL 1376899 (10th Cir. 2006) (applying Watkins to reach a similar

outcome based upon a similar set of facts); see also Tech. Adv. Mem. 200452033 (Sept.
27, 2004) (applying the substitution doctrine after the enactment of Code § 1234A and
after the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Best).
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Court has identified a critical criterion that focuses on whether the asset has
appreciated over time. 93 In instances where the taxpayer's profit is not attributable
to such appreciation, the substitution doctrine is applied and ordinary income
results.' 94 This limitation on the capital gain concept makes sense not only as a
matter of Congress's intent but also as a matter ofpolicy; it reserves the preferential
rate on gains for taxpayers who might otherwise be deterred from making a sale95in
order to ameliorate the lock-in effect that the realization requirement creates.
Recently, disagreement in the Circuit Courts has erupted concerning the
importance ofthe appreciation-over-time criterion and the foundational role it plays
in the substitution doctrine. In UnitedStates v. Maginnis,96 the Ninth Circuit held
that a taxpayer who had won a lottery had ordinary income when he sold his right
to receive the proceeds. 97 In invoking the substitution doctrine, the court
emphasized that the taxpayer did not satisfy the appreciation-over-time criterion. 98
The court reasoned that the difference between the cost of the lottery ticket and the
sales price for the right to receive the proceeds could not be viewed as the requisite
appreciation. "'
Analyzing a very similar fact pattern involving the sale of future lottery
proceeds, in Lattera v. Comm 'r,2°° the Third Circuit took a different approach.2 °1
It deduced a framework from the Supreme Court's cases that excludes the
appreciation-over-time criterion as a relevant variable in the substitution
doctrine. °2 It pointed out that the Supreme Court had applied the substitution
193. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. at57 (1965); see Gillette Motor Transp.,
Inc., 364 U.S. at 134; P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. at 265.

194. See supra note 180.
195. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin, Saving the Income Tax: An Agenda for
Research, 24 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 493 (1998) (indicating that the preferential capital gain
rate is designed in part to address the lock-in effect, under which taxpayers are
dissuaded from selling assets because of the potential tax liability); see also Comm'r v.
P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265 (1958) (explaining that Congress was concerned
about the deterrent effect on taxpayers inclined to make a sale absent the preferential
rate).
196. 356 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2004).
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 1186-87.
Id. at 1184.
Id.
437 F.3d 399 (3rd Cir. 2006).

201. In disagreeing with Maginnis,the Third Circuit embraced a critique ofthe
decision. Id. at 404-06. See generally Matthew S. Levine, Comment, Lottery Winnings
as Capital Gains, 114 Yale L.J. 195, 197-202 (2004) (critiquing Maginnis);Thomas G.
Sinclair, Comment, Limiting the Substitute-for-Ordinary Income Doctrine: An Analysis
Through its Most Recent Application Involving the Sale of Future Lottery Rights, 56
S.C. L. Rev. 387, 421-22 (2004).
202. Under the Third Circuit framework - which, parenthetically, is dicta there is a threshold inquiry as to whether the arrangement more closely resembles a
substitution or capital gain type of transaction. Lattera, 437 F.3d at 405-06. Ifthe issue
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doctrine in two cases notwithstanding the fact, from the Third Circuit's
perspective, that the taxpayer's profit could be viewed as attributable to
appreciation accruing during the taxpayer's ownership of the asset. 20 3 Based on
these cases, the court concluded that the appreciation-over-time criterion could not
entirely explain the outcome of the Supreme Court's cases, thus justifying its
decision to exclude the criterion from its framework.2 °4 Ultimately, applying its
own framework, the Third Circuit nevertheless reached the same outcome as the
Ninth Circuit in Maginnis:the sale of the right to receive lottery proceeds produces
ordinary income under the substitution doctrine.2 5
The Third Circuit's failure to incorporate the appreciation-over-time
criterion into its framework reflects a misreading of the Supreme Court's
substitution cases. Surprisingly, the Third Circuit does not acknowledge that the
is not resolved under this test, it becomes necessary to determine whether, in the court's
terminology, the taxpayer has disposed of a vertical slice (i.e., where the taxpayer sells
a complete undivided property interest) or a horizontal slice (i.e., where the taxpayer
disposes of a part of his property interest and also retains a portion, too). Id. at 406-07.
Where there is a disposition of a horizontal slice, the substitution doctrine is to be
applied. Id. at 407. On the other hand, in the case of a vertical slice, a further
determination must be made: whether the taxpayer disposes of the right to receive
income that has already been earned, Id. at 407-09, or, instead, the right to receive
income to be earned. The doctrine is to be applied in the former but not the latter case.
See id. at 409.
203. See id. at 405 (indicating that the Supreme Court had invoked the
substitution doctrine, even though the taxpayers held investment assets capable of
appreciation, in Comm 'r v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), and Hort v. Comm 'r,
313 U.S. 28 (1941)). It is certainly plausible that, in P. G. Lake, the amount received by
the taxpayer was attributable in part to appreciation in the taxpayer's investment (i.e.,
the price the taxpayer received for selling the oil payment right may well have stemmed
in part from the appreciation in the underlying investment that had accrued during the
time of the taxpayer's ownership). In Hort, on the other hand, contrary to the Third
Circuit's characterization, the amount the taxpayer/lessor received from the lessee as
consideration for canceling the lease does not appear to reflect appreciation in the
underlying investment.
204. Lattera,437 F.3d at 405. In supporting its argument against the use of the
appreciation-over-time criterion, the court uses a car as an example. Id. at 405. Since,
the court says, cars tend to decline in value, use of the appreciation-over-time criterion
would create an anomalous result in this context: the substitution doctrine would always
preclude capital gain treatment on the sale of a car. See id. This is a faulty analysis that
is predicated on a lack of understanding of the appreciation-over-time criterion and the
substitution doctrine itself. The criterion - as well as the doctrine - can only have
relevance where the transaction produces a profit. The doctrine can have no application
where, as in the car example, loss occurs. As properly applied, the substitution doctrine
converts profit that would otherwise qualify for capital gain treatment into ordinary
gain. Thus, in the car example, should it for some reason be sold at a profit, capital gain
would result - the profit having accrued over the period of the taxpayer's ownership.
205. Id. at 405-10.
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Supreme Court, in some of its decisions, explicitly references the appreciationover-time criterion when it invokes the substitution doctrine.2 °6 Indeed,
inexplicably, the Third Circuit relies upon one of these cases, Comm 'r v.
P. G.Lake,2 °7 in its attempt to demonstrate the Supreme Court's failure to apply the
appreciation-over-time criterion 20 8 - seemingly oblivious to the fact that the P. G.
Lake decision explicitly alludes to the criterion in explicating the policy rationale
underlying the capital gain concept.2 °9
What accounts for the Third Circuit's resistance to the appreciation-overtime criterion? This illustration should provide some insight: Suppose a taxpayer
purchases stock at a cost of $10,000 and then one year later, when its value has
increased to $15,000, sells the right to receive dividends on the stock for a period
of, say, three years. Under Supreme Court precedent, the sale is clearly subject to
the substitution doctrine and therefore produces ordinary income.21 ° Yet, in what
was presumably the Third Circuit's perception, some of the sales proceeds could
be conceivably viewed as attributable to the appreciation accruing during the year
of ownership (if, for example, the company prospers and the increase in the value
of the stock corresponds with an increased dividend, some portion of the sale
proceeds could be seen as related to the appreciation). One can surmise that the
Third Circuit may have been concerned that, if it included the criterion in its
framework, capital gain treatment would become available in this example - a
result that is palpably wrong.
Contrary to this thinking, however, there is no tension between the
appreciation-over-time criterion and ordinary income treatment for such a dividend
sale transaction, for the taxpayer in this example would not be able to establish that
the entire income (or gain) generated by the sale was attributable to appreciation.
At best, the taxpayer might be able to show that a portion of the profit could be so
attributed. This can be contrasted with a typical case in which capital gain
treatment is appropriate: where the entire gain is clearly the product of appreciation
in the investment. Thus, the Third Circuit could have embraced the appreciationover-time criterion without permitting capital gain treatment in the dividend sale
example. It could have done so by making the substitution doctrine operative
where, as in the example, a taxpayer cannot establish that the entire gain is
attributable to appreciation over time. Simply put, the Third Circuit's reading ofthe
206. See United States v Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965); Comm'r
v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
207. See Lattera,437 F.3d at 405 (referencing the Supreme Court decision in
P. G. Lake).

208. The court also referenced the Supreme Court's decision inHort,313 U.S.
at 28. See Lattera,437 F.3d at 405.
209. See P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 265.
210. See Comm 'r v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958) (involving similar facts
conceming the sale of an oil payment right where the taxpayer retained the underlying
asset); see also Estate of Frank D. Stranahan v. Comm'r, 472 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1973)
(applying P.G. Lake in the context of such a dividend sale).
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Supreme Court's substitution cases is not a faithful one. A more accurate reading
of the cases is as follows: unless a taxpayer is able to establish that the entire gain
is attributable to appreciation over time, the substitution doctrine is to be applied
and ordinary income results.
In the lottery cases, as the Ninth Circuit in Maginnis concluded, the
substitution doctrine is properly applied because the appreciation-over-time
criterion, as conceived by the Supreme Court, is not satisfied. Concededly, it is
arguable that a taxpayer who buys a lottery ticket and holds it until the drawing is
in a somewhat similar position to a typical stock investor who hopes that the
company in which he invests will be awarded an important government contract.
In both cases, the appreciation accrues at the moment of the favorable event (the
drawing or the contract award). Yet the substitution doctrine applies in the case of
the lottery but not the stock investment.
So how does the appreciation-over-time criterion permit a distinction to
be made between these two cases? In formulating the appreciation-over-time
criterion, the Supreme Court did not intend that it would be applied so that capital
gain treatment could be obtained in a case like the lottery. As the Court has
indicated, the criterion is designed so that capital gain treatment is targeted at
taxpayers who might otherwise be deterred from selling their investment;21 ' the
stock investor might well be inclined to continue holding the stock after the
favorable contract is awarded to the company in order to avoid paying the tax on
the stock's appreciation. In the case of the lottery, in contrast, there is no such
deterrent effect. Once the taxpayer is chosen as the winner, unlike the stock
investor, he or she has no option by which to defer the income. Given the absence
of any deterrent effect in the case of the lottery winner, a conclusion that the
appreciation-over-time criterion is satisfied in this context and that capital gain
treatment should therefore be appropriate would be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's purpose in establishing it. The taxpayers in the lottery cases are therefore
appropriately subject to the substitution doctrine.212
The Latteraframework fails to capture not only the Supreme Court's cases
but also a widely accepted Second Circuit decision. By the Third Circuit's own
concession, its framework cannot account for the outcome in McAllister v.
Comm 'r213 a pro taxpayer decision that even the IRS has embraced."' It explains
away this difficulty by concluding that McAllister was wrongly decided.2" ' The

211. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 265.

212. In also holding that the sale of the right to receive the lottery proceeds
results in ordinary income under the substitution doctrine, the 10th Circuit found it
unnecessary to engage in the dispute. See Watkins v. Comm'r, 447 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir.
2006).
213. 157 F.2d 235 (2nd Cir. 1946); see Lattera v. Comm'r, 437 F.3d 399, 409
n.5 (3rd Cir. 2006).
214. See Rev. Rul. 72-243, 1972-1 C.B. 233 (embracing McAllister).
215. See Lattera, 437 F.3d at 409 n.5.
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problem, however, is not with McAllister but rather with the Lattera court's
framework.
In McAllister, the taxpayer sold an income interest that she held under a
testamentary trust.2 16 The Second Circuit rejected the IRS's substitution doctrine
argument, holding that the taxpayer should be treated as having sold a capital
asset.21 7 At an impressionistic level, the Third Circuit's criticism of McAllister
appears to be well-founded, for if the taxpayer had retained the interest instead of
selling it, the income received from the trust would have been ordinary in
character. Thus, based on this view, the sale accelerated the receipt of income and
should be taxed no differently than the income itself.
More properly viewed, however, the sale of a term interest should, as the
court in McAllister held, qualify for capital gain treatment. To illustrate, consider
a testamentary trust that is required to pay income to A for life and the remainder
to B. Assume that at the testator's death the value of the asset bequeathed in trust
is $100,000 and that, based on A's life expectancy, the actuarial tables reflect that
the value of A's interest and B's interest in the trust is equal to, respectively, 40
percent and 60 percent of the corpus. On these assumptions, A's basis in the
income interest would be $40,000, and B's basis in the remainder interest would
be $60,000.218 If, shortly after the testator's death, the value of the trust's assets
increased to $200,000 and A and B simultaneously sold their interests in the trust
for an aggregate price of $200,000 (with A receiving 40 percent, or $80,000, and
B receiving 60 percent, or $120,000),2"9 A would recognize a capital gain of
$40,000 on the sale; (A's amount realized of $80,000 minus a basis of $40,000).
B would recognize a capital gain of $60,000 (B's amount realized of $120,000
minus a basis of $60,000).
Contrary to Lattera, as well as the critique it references,"2 this is the
correct result. Had the testator instead made an outright bequest to A and B with
A receiving a 40 percent interest and B receiving a 60 percent interest as tenants
in common, a simultaneous sale of the two interests at an aggregate price of
$200,000 would produce the same amount of capital gain for A and B (A's gain
would be $40,000, and B's would be $60,000). There is nojustification for treating
the simultaneous sale of an income and remainder interest any differently from a
sale by tenants in common.
216. Id. at 236-37.
217. McAllister, 157 F.2d at 235.
218. See Regs. § 1.1014-5(a).
219. In reality, A's interest, and therefore A's basis, would be somewhat less
than 40% at the point of sale given that, over time, the income beneficiary's interest in
the trust is deemed to be reduced and the remainderman's is deemed to increase
concomitantly. See Regs. § 1.1014-5(a). In the example, since the sale occurs so shortly
after the testator's death, no attempt is made to compute A's reduced interest.
220. See Lattera, 437 F.3d at 409 n.5 (referencing Marvin A. Chirelstein,
Federal Income Taxation at 373, at 17.03, (9th ed. 2002), for the proposition that
McAllister was wrongly decided).
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Treating the simultaneous sale of the income and remainder interest in this
fashion is consistent with the appreciation-over-time criterion. A's and B's gain,
an aggregate of $100,000, would be exactly equal to the $100,000 increase in the
value of the trust's asset after the testator's death. Their gain, in other words, would
be entirely attributable to appreciation accruing during their period of ownership
as beneficiaries. While, as the Latteracourt indicates, there may be cases in which
extenuating circumstances call for the substitution doctrine to apply where the gain
accrues during the taxpayer's ownership, no such circumstances are present in this
example."' Thus, A (as well as B) should receive capital gain treatment on the sale.
In short, the Latteracourt's difficulty with the outcome in McAllister is directly
related to its failure to include the appreciation-over-time criterion in its
framework.
Taxpayers who participate in the premium financing arrangement and
transfer the policy to the investor at the time the note matures cannot maintain that
their benefit represents appreciation in an asset accruing over time. Under a proper
application of the substitution doctrine, therefore, ordinary gain should result at the
time of transfer. As a matter of substance, such a taxpayer receives in effect free
life insurance during the term of the note as compensation for agreeing to acquire
the policy; the note being nonrecourse, the taxpayer is under no obligation to repay
221. In Comm'r v. P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. 260 (1958), see id. at 262, 265, in
contrast, where the taxpayer sold a carved-out right and retained the balance of its
interest in the investment, the taxpayer could not have established that the entire profit
was attributable to appreciation that had accrued during the taxpayer's ownership. While
some portion of the profit might have been the result of appreciation in the underlying
asset, the taxpayer could not have established that the entireprofit was so attributable.
222. The outcome in the trust examples would be different if A and B did not
sell their interests simultaneously. In the case of a nonsimultaneous sale, the income

beneficiary is not permitted to offset any basis against the amount realized on the sale.
See IRC § 1001(e). Thus, A would be required to recognize as capital gain the entire
amount realized on the sale if B did not simultaneously sell the remainder interest. This

denial of a basis offset to A is entirely unrelated to the substitution doctrine and its
concern about taxpayers converting what is essentially ordinary income to capital gain.
Rather, it stems from a concern about trust beneficiaries manipulating the basis
provisions to manufacture an overstated basis. Prior to 1969, it was possible for a trust

beneficiary to sell the income interest and claim a basis offset based on the actuarial
percentage of the interest at the time of sale and the date-of-death value of the trust's
assets. See Regs. § 1.1001-5(a). The problem arose if the remainderman subsequently
sold the remainder interest. If, for example, the sale were made at approximately the
time the income interest terminated, the remainderman could claim as a basis the entire

date-of-death value of the trust's assets. See id. This would, of course, permit an
income beneficiary and remainderman to enjoy, in the aggregate, a basis offset in excess
of 100% of the asset's date-of-death value. To prevent taxpayers from exploiting the
basis rules in this fashion, Congress added Code § 1001(e) in the Tax Reform Act of
1969. Tax Reform Act of 1969, See Pub L. No. 91-172, § 516(a) 83 Stat. 487, 649
(1969). See also Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation, 387-89, at 17.03
(10th ed. 2005) (explaining this rationale for the 1969 amendment).
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the note or to otherwise pay for the insurance provided. From the investor's
perspective, at the maturity of the note, the policy is a valuable investment, which
could not have been acquired without compensating the taxpayer for agreeing to
participate. In somewhat analogous contexts, the courts have held that
compensation of this kind constitutes ordinary income.223
The compensatory character of the arrangement cannot be altered by
"dressing up" the transaction to look like the sale of an asset.224 The taxpayer's
amount realized on the transfer of the policy to the investor would be equal to the

223. See Sutter v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. Memo (CCH) 59, T.C. Memo (RIA)
98,250 (1998); Haderlie v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1254, T.C. Memo (RIA)
97,525 (1997). In Sutter and Haderlie, as part of a prearrangement, the taxpayers
borrowed money on a nonrecourse basis from an entity controlled by an insurance
agent. Sutter, 76 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 59-60, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 98-1449 to 98-1450;
Haderlie,74 T. C. Memo (CCH)at 1255, T.C. Memo (RIA)at 97-3500 to 97-3501. The
borrowed moneys were then used by the taxpayer to pay premiums on policies sold by
the insurance agent. Sutter, 76 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 60, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 98-1499;
Haderlie, 74 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1255, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 97-3501. Finding the
nonrecourse note was illusory, both the Sutter and Haderliecourts held that the entire
amount of the premium advanced to the taxpayer/insured represented compensation for
agreeing to acquire the policy (in Haderlie, the court held that the entire premium
constituted gross income, whereas in Sutter the taxpayer conceded that Haderlie was
correct as to this point). Sutter, 76 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 61-62, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 981451 to 98-1453; Haderlie,74 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 1255-57, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 973501 to 97-3503. It should be emphasized that, in these cases, the parties did not treat
the nonrecourse note as if it had legal significance, thus permitting each court to find
that it was illusory. In Sutter, the court relied on its decision in Comm 'r v. Wentz, 105
T.C. 1 (1995), where it had held that the entire premium (not simply the cost of
comparable term insurance) rebated to the insured must be included in the participating
taxpayer's gross income. Sutter, 76 T.C. Memo (CCH) at 61, T.C. Memo (RIA) at 981451 to 98-1452; Wentz, 105 T.C. at 11-12. For a discussion of the contexts in which
nonrecourse notes may be disregarded, see, generally, Mitchell M. Gans, Re-Examining
the Sham Doctrine: When Should an Overpayment Be Reflected in Basis?, 30 Buff. L.
Rev. 95 (1981).
224. In some cases, the investor may loan an amount to the taxpayer that is
greater than the premiums due during the term of the arrangement. In effect, the
taxpayer receives this cash-in-the-pocket inducement, which will not have to be repaid
if the policy is transferred to the investor in discharge of the nonrecourse note, in order
to equalize the values. In other words, in the judgment of the parties, the life insurance
policy is expected to have a value at the maturity of the note that is greater than the
amount necessary to pay the premiums during the arrangement - thus requiring the
investor to provide an additional inducement. The presence of such an additional
inducement would not alter the tax consequences. The amount of the taxpayer's
ordinary income would now include the amount of the inducement, as well as the
amount of the premiums supplied by the investor. Both the free-insurance and the cashin-the-pocket inducements represent, in substance, compensation to the taxpayer for
agreeing to acquire the policy and should be treated as such. See IRC § 61.
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amount of the note, 5 which would in turn equal the value of the free insurance
received by the taxpayer.226 The critical point is that, if at maturity, the taxpayer
transfers the policy to the investor, no part of the gain represents appreciation
accruing to the taxpayer over time. Rather, it represents the value of the free life
insurance provided by the investor in order to induce the taxpayer to participate in
the transaction. Put differently, with the right to the free insurance conferred at the
outset, the taxpayer's benefit cannot be attributed to ownership of an appreciating
asset. Thus, under a proper application of the substitution doctrine, the gain should
be ordinary in character.
If, on the other hand, the taxpayer decided to retain the policy - perhaps
because of a decline in health and a concomitant increase in the policy's value there would be no taxable event unless the taxpayer subsequently sold the policy
or surrendered it to the insurance company.227 In the event of such a sale or
surrender, the gain should be bifurcated; under the substitution doctrine, the portion
equal to the amount of free insurance should be ordinary gain, and the balance,
attributable to the appreciation in the policy's value, should be capital gain.228
VII. CONCLUSION

Historically, taxpayers who chose to dispose oftheir life insurance policies
during their lives would surrender them to the issuing company. However, there
is now a marketplace in which investors are willing to buy policies that a taxpayer
no longer needs or wishes to retain. In addition, a new premium financing method
is emerging, which grants taxpayers an option to sell their policies within the first
few years after acquiring them. The sale of policies has thus become increasingly
prevalent. As a result of this shift, the tax community has begun to focus on the
computation of gain, raising questions about the determination of basis.
225. See Regs. § 1.1001-2.
226. The amount realized would also include the amount of any accrued
interest. See, e.g., Catalano,79 T.C. Memo (CCH) 1632, T. C.Memo (RIA) 2000-082
(2000), overruled on other grounds by Catalanov. Comm 'r,279 F.3d (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the amount realized on the surrender of an asset in discharge of a
nonrecourse note includes accrued interest). The taxpayer would be deemed to pay the
interest at the time of the discharge, see id., but no deduction would be available for the
deemed payment. See IRC § 264.
227. If retained until death, the proceeds would not be taxable. See IRC §101.
228. For a similar bifurcation ofgain in an analogous context, see, e.g., Bolnick
v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 245, 253-57 (1965), acq., 1980-2 C.B. 1 (applying the Supreme
Court's decision in Midland-Ross and concluding that, on redemption of a bond, the
portion of the proceeds attributable to earned original interest was ordinary income
under the substitution doctrine and that any additional gain on the redemption
constituted capital gain); see also Rev. Rul. 80-143, 1980-1 C.B. 19 (embracing the
reasoning found in Bolnick).
With respect to capital gain treatment of the surrender of a policy, see supra
note 177.
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While the Code mandates the use of the aggregate premium approach in
determining gain on a policy surrender, it is silent about the appropriate
methodology for determining basis in the case of a sale. In its published guidance
on the consequences of a sale, the IRS has applied an aggregate premium approach.
But, in private letter rulings, the IRS has instead applied a policy investment
approach, under which a policy's basis is reduced by the cost-of-insurance
protection.
We argue in favor of the policy investment theory and sketch out a new
model (i.e., the hypothetical term method) for its implementation. We call for
legislation that would incorporate this theory, making it uniformly applicable to
insurance policy surrenders as well as to their sales. Short of such legislation, we
suggest a second-best strategy for the IRS: revocation of its published guidance and
promulgation of a new regulation. Recognizing that our model deviates from the
IRS's long-standing commitment to a contrary approach, we consider whether the
courts would uphold such a regulation. After examining the Supreme Court's
deference jurisprudence and critiquing the Tax Court's recent invalidation of a
regulation, we conclude that the regulation we propose should withstand taxpayer
challenge.

